Warranties and Limits on Sales Contracts - Module 3 of 5
See Also:
Module 3: Warranties and Limits on
Sales Contracts
After
discussing the nature and formation of sales contracts under the UCC in the
first two modules, we’ll now turn to warranties - either expressed or implied- in
contracts for sales of goods. We’ll also cover the unconscionability rule,
which limits the enforceability of a contract that may be unfair to one party.
Disclaimers of warranties are often challenged on this ground. Finally, we’ll
cover special issues of disclaimers, warranties and unconscionability, as
applied to e-commerce and online transactions.
Express Warranties
Reasonable
purchaser expectations based on assertions made by the seller during the
transaction or in advertising its product constitute warranties.[1] Warranties may be found in what is said or
written, the conduct of the parties or the type of transaction. When examining warranty issues, the courts
must determine if there was a warranty and its meaning.The courts must further determine if the
warranty became part of the agreement or if it was properly excluded by a
disclaimer.[2]
An express
warranty is a seller’s representation that becomes part of “the basis of the
bargain”[3]
while an implied warranty is inferred from the transactional
circumstances or the conduct of the parties.[4]
An
express warranty is a seller’s affirmation of a fact or promise that relates to
the goods, the description of the goods or samples or models of the goods.[5] Prior to the UCC, buyers assumed the burden
of showing that they relied on sellers’ promises in cases involving express
warranty. Under the Code, reliance on warranties is generally assumed, though the
seller can disprove reliance with evidence.[6]
In
the course of negotiations, sellers often make promises. Some of these promises are mere opinions or
commonplace exaggerations.These
assertions, sometimes called “puffing,” do not necessarily constitute
warranties. However, courts differ as to
where to draw the line between an enforceable warranty promise and what is
merely a sales gimmick. The factors a
court can use to assess whether a promise constitutes an express warranty
include the specificity of the claim, the context in which the claim was made,
the nature of the defect that violates the warranty, the relative knowledge and
sophistication of the parties, the seller’s choice of language and whether the
claim was written or oral.[7] Courts vary in their application of these
factors and no one factor on its own determines the outcome.[8]
For example, assume Arthur buys a Ford truck from
Robert Jackson, owner of Jackson’s Used Cars. Robert tells Arthur that a particular truck is the “best on the road”
and “will last for many years.” He goes
on to tell Arthur that the brakes and spark plugs are new. Arthur buys the truck, but the truck begins
to malfunction over the next couple of weeks. When Arthur brings the truck to a mechanic, the mechanic informs him
that the brakes are worn, and the spark plugs are misfiring. A court would likely find that Robert’s
claims that the truck is the “best on the road” and “will last for many years”
are merely typically sales claims that do not constitute legally enforceable
warranties. The claims pertaining to the brakes and spark plugs are
sufficiently specific to constitute a breach of express warranty and even fraud
if untrue.
Another
type of express warranty involves a description of the goods.[9] The description may incorporate industry
standards or special terminology, or it may be very simple. A “car” evokes certain properties that can be
construed as promises [10] It has wheels and is reasonably capable of
transporting people and things. A
vehicle that fails to function in this way may violate any express and implied promises
that it would function as a “car.”
Samples
or models furnished by the seller may serve as promises as to what the seller
is providing.[11] A sample is a unit “drawn from the
bulk of goods which is the subject matter of the sale.”[12] A model is a demonstration unit that
is “offered for inspection when the subject matter of the sale is not available
at hand and the demonstration unit is not from the bulk of the goods” that is
the subject of the sale.[13] So, if the product sold is substantially
inferior to the sample or model provided to the buyer during the negotiation,
this could constitute a breach of warranty.
Implied Warranties
There is the reasonable expectation that goods sold by merchants are of such quality that is normally associated with goods of that type.[14] Cars have to run, stoves have to cook and refrigerators have to refrigerate. To be merchantable, goods must be “fit for the ordinary purposes” for which they are used, adequately packaged and labelled and able to pass in the trade without objection.[15] This is called the “implied warranty of merchantability” and it applies to merchants only. A buyer is entitled to expect that goods from a merchant will conform to these requirements even without explicit claims by the seller. To determine whether goods are considered merchantable, a court may consider factors such as the parties’ course of performance and dealings, trade usage and custom, whether the goods are new or used, the price of the goods, characteristics of similar brands and government regulations and standards.[16]
Similar
is the warranty of “implied fitness for a particular purpose.” Where a buyer
relies on the seller’s skill or judgment to acquire goods intended for a
specific application, then the buyer can claim breach of warranty if the goods
do not meet the buyer’s reasonable expectation for that endeavor.[17] An ordinary purpose (for which the
implied warranty of merchantability applies) pertains to a purpose customary
for those goods, while a particular purpose applies to a specific use peculiar
to the nature of the buyer’s business. Unlike the warranty of merchantability, the warranty of a particular
purpose may apply to non-merchants as well as merchants. However, also unlike
the warranty of merchantability, the buyer must prove reliance on the seller’s
expertise in making the purchase. The
buyer must also show that the seller had reason to know of the use for which
the buyer was buying the goods.[18]
For example, Arlene moves from Florida to Massachusetts
and has never seen snow. She visits
Robert Jackson of Jackson’s Used Cars and tells Jackson that she needs a truck
to plow her driveway in snowstorms. Jackson sells to Arlene a Ford sport utility vehicle. When Arlene arrives home with her new
purchase, she reads in the owner’s manual that the vehicle will not accommodate
a plow attachment. Arlene can successfully sustain a claim against Jackson for
breach of the warranty for fitness for a particular purpose even if Jackson
never explicitly said the truck would be suitable for plowing snow.
In
resolving disputes, courts can also look to the knowledge and sophistication of
the parties, as well as their conduct. Factors such as who initiated the transaction, oral or written claims
and reliance and whether the buyer insisted on a particular brand help indicate
whether or not there was an implied warranty.[19]
In
addition to the two warranties of quality, buyers are also entitled to a warranty
of title.[20] That warranty guarantees that the seller is
conveying good title to the goods as the rightful owner of the goods, that they are free from any third party claims,
security interests or liens and that there are no undisclosed co-owners of the
goods.[21]
Warranty Disclaimers
While
the Code imposes upon the seller responsibility for ensuring that the products
comply with the Code’s warranty standards, the Code also encourages freedom of
contract and consequently allows sellers to invalidate those warranties in
specific ways.[22] Still, warranties are often viewed with
scrutiny by courts since they can deprive the buyer of his reasonable
expectations regarding the performance of a product.
Express
warranties (such as those made in advertising or negotiations) may be
disclaimed under the UCC. However,
language of disclaimers must be clear.To the extent possible, disclaimers must
be interpreted consistently with other claims made, not to override them unless
such is clear from the language of the disclaimer.[23]
So, for example, a disclaimer from a car dealership that the car is sold
“as-is” does not necessarily negate an advertised warranty that any used car
sold on the lot has only had a single owner. While “as-is” is typical
disclaimer language, it’s use doesn’t contradict a single-owner claim. As such,
the single-owner claim can survive an “as-is” disclaimer.
Note
that the parol evidence rule applies to warranties, which are terms in a sales agreement.
For example, if a written sales contract makes no disclaimer, but the seller
tells the buyer that the product is sold as-is, evidence of this oral
disclaimer may be precluded by the parol evidence rule, especially when the
written agreement is considered complete.
The
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose can
also be disclaimed. The seller must provide the disclaimer using language that
is “conspicuous,”[24]
which means that it must be presented in a manner that is likely to be noticed,
seen or heard by the buyer. The disclaimer need not necessarily be in writing,
but it must use the word “merchantability.”[25] However, a disclaimer for the warranty for a
particular purpose must be in writing but need not use the phrase “particular
purpose.”[26]
It
is common practice, therefore, for merchants to put, in conspicuous terms on
their sales contracts, language such as “SELLER hereby disclaims all
warranties, express or implied, including the implied warranty of
merchantability and any implied fitness for a particular purpose.” While there
are exceptions where such would be unconscionable, these tactics can, by and
large, be effective.
Moreover,
when a buyer has a chance to inspect the goods and where the language of the
agreement or intent of the parties demonstrates that the buyer is independently
inspecting the goods and relying on that inspection, such inspection may
invalidate implied warranties.
A
further exception is an effective disclaimer based on the course of dealing,
usage of trade or prior course of performance. The conduct of the parties, such as honoring disclaimers in the past,
may be sufficient to give effect even to a disclaimer that does not meet the
formal requirements of the Code.
Injuries to Third-Parties
“Privity”
refers to a party to an agreement. A
non-privity party, or “third” party, is a person who is not a party to an
agreement, but who wishes to make a claim under an agreement or warranty.[27]
A third party can be a “vertical” non-privity party, which means a second-hand
buyer who purchased the good from the original purchaser (and thus never dealt
with the original seller) or a “horizontal” non-privity party, who never owned
the product, such as a passenger in a car purchased by another person.[28]
The
issue with respect to sales contracts is whether these third parties have
standing to claim breach of warranty against a seller. For example, can a
passenger in someone else’s car sue the car’s manufacturer for a defect that
caused her an injury?
The
UCC provides that the answer is yes, but only in some cases. The drafters of
the UCC provided three separate alternatives for how far sellers’ liabilities
to third parties extend, and states are free to choose from among these
possibilities. One alternative extends warranty protection only to family
members or guests of the immediate purchaser. A second alternative extends
warranty protection to anyone affected by the product to whom injury is
reasonably foreseeable. This applies only to personal injuries. The broadest
alternative extends warranty protection to anyone affected by the product who
may be foreseeably injured and includes personal injury as well as property
damage.
Unconscionability
Unconscionability in contracts is a common law doctrine that empowers a party to a contract to escape enforcement based on “procedural” or “substantive” unfairness. Procedural unconscionability involves the context in which the agreement is formed while substantive unconscionability pertains to the terms of the agreement.[29]
For example, Arthur buys a car from Jackson’s Used Cars. Robert Jackson, the proprietor and seller rushes Arthur through the document signing process during which Arthur signs several documents with blanks. Robert tells Arthur that he will complete the forms after Robert leaves. Robert completes the forms after Arthur leaves and when Arthur gets them in the mail, he finds out that the financing terms and optional insurance are far more expensive than he was led to believe.
While also possibly fraudulent, Robert’s actions may give Arthur grounds to refuse compliance with the contract based on procedural unconscionability because Robert rushed Arthur through the signing and later filled in the blanks with terms profoundly adverse to Arthur. Arthur may also succeed by claiming substantive unconscionability if the terms of the financing and insurance terms of the contract were oppressively one-sided.
If
found unconscionable, a court may refuse to enforce the agreement or enforce
the remainder of the agreement without the unconscionable clause. Alternatively, it may limit the application
of a clause that produces an unconscionable result.The Code further allows the
parties to present evidence of the commercial setting, along with the purpose
and effect of an unconscionable aspect of the agreement.[30]
The
Code assigns the determination of unconscionability to the judge and unconscionability
is mostly raised as an affirmative defense to escape enforcement of the
contract.[31] With respect to procedural unconscionability,
courts must examine the relative bargaining power of the parties and their
respective sophistication, the ability of the consumer to read, speak and
understand the English language and the font and placement of the terms of an
agreement.[32]
Substantive
unconscionability cases involve issues pertaining to excessive price terms and
alteration of remedies. In one case,[33]
the court held unconscionable the sale of goods and services worth $959, along
with an $800 commission and an $809 finance charge. In another case[34]
a Spanish-speaking purchaser who signed a contract in English without the
benefit of any translation, bought a freezer that cost the seller $348, but
cost the buyer $900 in a financing contract where the payments totaled
$1,145.88. The court ruled that price to be unconscionable. Manipulation by contractual remedies may
include oppressive liquidated damages clauses, unfair overly broad disclaimers
of warranties and unfair repossession allowances.[35]
Electronic Transactions
Early
software was frequently encoded on compact discs.The contractual terms that governed the
rights and responsibilities of the parties were found in the license agreement
that was included with the software, either electronically or physically on
paper. The CD was wrapped in plastic and
the user had to unwrap the CD in order to access the user agreement. The
software license was therefore called a “shrinkwrap license.”[36] An early issue for the courts to decide was
therefore the enforceability of the terms of a license that the user could not
access until after the purchase.[37] In general, the courts ruled that these
agreements were enforceable.[38] The courts reasoned there are analogous
situations where purchasers of goods and services commit to contracts without an
opportunity to first review the terms of the agreement, such as insurance
contracts.
Software
licensing agreements took on a different form with the advent of the Internet. Shrinkwrap licenses became “browsewrap
agreements” and “clickwrap agreements.”[39] Purchasers enter into agreements by clicking
a mouse. The user then proceeds to
tender payment and download the software over the Internet. “Browse” cases
differ from “click” cases in that browse cases allow the user to browse the
website before indicating acceptance to the terms of the agreement while “click”
cases require the user to click on a box with an associated caption, such as “I
Accept.”
Courts
in these types of cases must address whether the user has adequately indicated
willingness to be bound to the agreement and the degree to which a purchaser
should be bound to the terms of the agreement when there was limited access for
review.[40] Clickwrap agreements have been held to be
enforceable, almost without exception. Browsewrap agreements are more challenging.[41] In these situations, a mere hyperlink to the
seller’s agreement is all that is available to the prospective purchaser. The placement and conspicuousness of the link
may determine its enforceability because there is no unequivocal manifestation
of the purchaser’s assent, as in clickwrap agreements. The principles of common law will often
govern the outcome of disputes pertaining to these types of agreements.[42]
In
our next module, we’ll turn to performance and breach of sales contracts.
[1] Henry D. Gabriel and Linda J. Rusch. The ABCs of the UCC: (Revised) Article 2:Sales. 54-55. (2004). This text is a good overview of the UCC but treats the proposed 2003 UCC revisions at length, which were abandoned in 2011 because no state chose to adopt them. Those discarded provisions were of course ignored in preparing these materials.
[12] Gabriel and Rusch, 58, citing Uniform Commercial Code - Sales. § 2-313. Official Comment 8. A specific state? I see something similar in Comment 6 for NY state and WA state.
[13] Gabriel and Rusch, 58, citing Uniform Commercial Code - Sales. § 2-313. Official Comment 8. Same ? as footnote 12.
[29] James J. White and Robert S. Summers, West HornbookSeries, Uniform Commercial Code, 6thEd. § 5-1 to 5-4 (2010); Uniform Commercial Code - Sales. § 2-302.
[33] American Home Improvement, Inc.v. MacIver 105 N.H. 435, 2d A.2d 886, 2 UCC 235 (1964), cited in Whiteand Summers, § 5-5.
[34] Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 3 UCC 1058 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev’d on issue ofrelief 54 Misc.2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 4 UCC 300 (1967), cited in White andSummers, § 5-5.
[37] ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 86F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), cited in White and Summers, Sec. 2-2(b).