The Free Exercise Clause - Module 2 of 5
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Module 2: The Free Exercise Clause
Overview
of the Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause of the First Amendment unquestionably
provides people with the right to freely exercise their religious beliefs
without the fear of interference or reprisal from the government. The right to religious
liberty is a cornerstone of preserving individual liberty and autonomy, of
ensuring that diverse religious beliefs and practices receive equal protection
under the law, and of preventing the government, through coercion or
intimidation, from establishing or promoting particular religious faiths.
Still, like all constitutional rights, it is not
absolute. In some circumstances the government, based on competing and
compelling interests, may regulate a particular religious practice. Thus,
determining when the government may – or may not – restrict the right to freely
exercise religion is critical to developing a comprehensive understanding of the
free exercise clause.
In this module, we will
examine the legal standards that courts rely on to decide whether laws
infringing on the right to freely exercise religion violate the free exercise clause,
and the contexts within which the government may restrict the freedom of
religion. In so doing, we will focus on landmark cases decided by the Supreme
Court that involve the following issues:
·
The
distinction between religious beliefs and practices, and the constitutional protections
afforded to beliefs as opposed to practices;
·
The
constitutionality of laws that intentionally or inadvertently target particular
religions;
·
The
extent to which people may claim exemptions from generally applicable laws that
infringe on sincerely held religious beliefs;
·
The
courts’ authority to assess the validity of particular religious beliefs; and
·
The
balance between respecting the rights of customers to receive service and
business owners’ rights to refuse service based on religious beliefs.
In its early decisions
interpreting the free exercise cause, the Supreme Court distinguished between
the protections afforded to religious beliefs as opposed to practices. Although
religious beliefs received the highest levels of constitutional protection,
religious practices receive a lesser degree of protection and, as such, in some
circumstances the government could permissibly regulate such practices.
The Supreme Court
established this principle in Reynolds v.
United States, where the petitioner, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, argued that the Anti-Bigamy Act, which prohibited
individuals from having multiple wives, infringed on his religious beliefs
allowing men to marry more than one woman.[1] The Supreme Court
disagreed with the Petitioner’s argument, holding that, although Congress could
not restrict religious beliefs, it could, in certain circumstances, regulate
religious practices, such as polygamy. The Court stated:
Congress cannot pass a law for the
government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free exercise of
religion. The first amendment to the Constitution expressly forbids such
legislation…. Congress was deprived of
all legislative power over mere opinion, but Congress was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.[2]
Although Congress could not outlaw people’ right to believe in polygamy, it could regulate
the practice of polygamy. Thus, after
Reynolds, laws regulating religious
practices could survive constitutional scrutiny if the government provided sufficiently compelling reasons to
support such regulations.
Laws
That Target or Disproportionately Impact Particular Religions
The Supreme Court has
held that laws targeting or burdening particular religions, whether
intentionally or inadvertently, violate the free exercise clause.
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court confronted
the issue of whether a law prohibiting the slaughter of animals “in a public or
private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption" violated the Free Exercise Clause.[3] A religious organization,
which slaughtered animals during ritualistic ceremonies, claimed that the law
infringed on its right to freely exercise religion.
In a unanimous decision,
the Court held that the law violated the organization’s religious liberty
because the legislature, when enacting the law, specifically targeted the
religiously motivated slaughter of animals.[4] The key distinction
between that case and others in which religious organizations were subject to
general laws is that, there, the legislature did not merely strive to regulate
a religious practice; rather, it specifically targeted for regulation the practices of a particular religion. Thus,
the Court held that the discriminatory effects of such targeting violated the free
exercise clause.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court considered whether a law requiring
children to attend public school until the age of sixteen violated the free exercise
clause, as applied to the Amish people. The petitioners, who were members of
the Amish faith, argued that the law violated their religious beliefs, which including
educating and raising children based on Amish religious doctrine and values.[5]
The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the Amish, holding the state’s interest in educating children did
not outweigh the Amish’s religious beliefs. In so doing, the Court stated;
Formal high school education beyond the
eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs not only because it places Amish
children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs, with increasing emphasis
on competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the
styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them
away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and
formative adolescent period of life. During this period, the children must
acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific
skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. They
must learn to enjoy physical labor. Once a child has learned basic reading,
writing, and elementary mathematics, these traits, skills, and attitudes
admittedly fall within the category of those best learned through example and
"doing," rather than in a classroom. And, at this time in life, the
Amish child must also grow in his faith and his relationship to the Amish
community if he is to be prepared to accept the heavy obligations imposed by
adult baptism. In short, high school attendance with teachers who are not of
the Amish faith -- and may even be hostile to it -- interposes a serious
barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the Amish religious
community.[6]
The Yoder Court predicated its decision on
the fact that compliance with the state’s law would significantly undermine the
Amish’s basic religious beliefs and mission.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a business
owner who baked wedding cakes for soon-to-be married couples, refused to bake a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple, claiming that doing so would violate his
religious belief opposing same-sex marriage.[7]
In a 6-3 decision, the
Supreme Court did not directly address whether business owners, because of their
religious beliefs, may refuse services to same-sex couples. Instead, the Court
reversed the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s ruling in favor of the business
owner because the Commission’s ruling demonstrated hostility, or animus, toward
the business owner’s religious beliefs. Writing for the majority, Justice
Anthony Kennedy emphasized that it was "inappropriate for a Commission
charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of
Colorado’s anti-discrimination law" to make statements showing disdain for
and disapproval of the owners’ religious beliefs.[8]
The Court’s ruling in Masterpiece
Cakeshop reaffirms the principle
that laws or decisions targeting, disparately impacting, or evidencing
hostility toward specific religions or religious beliefs violate the free exercise
clause.
Exemptions
from Generally Applicable Laws
A frequent question
arising under the free exercise clause is whether people may claim exemptions
from generally applicable laws that apply to everyone on the basis that such
laws infringe on their religious beliefs. The answer to this question depends
on the severity of the infringement.
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court considered whether
a state may prohibit the use of controlled substances when that use was
necessary to fulfill someone’s religious beliefs.[9] In that case, a private
drug rehabilitation organization fired the petitioners because they ingested a
hallucinogenic drug (peyote), which they claimed was an integral aspect of
religious ceremonies at their Native American church.[10] Petitioners argued that,
because their religious belief authorized the ingestion of peyote, the law violated the free exercise clause.
The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that the law was generally applicable, as it applied to
everyone equally, and thus did not target or reflect animosity for particular religions
or religious beliefs.
Writing for the
majority, Justice Antonin Scalia explained that the Court had never “held that
an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”[11] Justice Scalia reasoned
as follows:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the
course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual
from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of
religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the person
from the discharge of political responsibilities.
In the Court’s view,
allowing people to claim exemption from a generally-applicable law “would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every person to become a law unto himself.”[12] As we discussed in module
1, though, Congress limited the abilities of laws to restrict religious freedom
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. That act prohibited
substantial interference with religious practice unless the government can show
that it was necessary to achieve a compelling government interest (an inquiry
process known as “strict scrutiny”).
The Supreme Court ruled
the RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state laws, however, ruling that under
principles of federalism, Congress cannot subject state legislation to this
sort of scrutiny in federal court.[13] Still, the RFRA remains
in full force and effect when the federal government is acting. So, federal
legislation or action restricting religious freedom must still pass strict
scrutiny.[14]
Assessing the Validity of Religious
Beliefs
The Supreme Court has
repeatedly interpreted the free exercise clause to prohibit legislatures and
courts from assessing the validity or legitimacy of specific religious beliefs.
In U.S. v. Ballard, for example,
the Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause protects people of all
religious faiths, and that neither legislatures nor courts may inquire into the
validity or legitimacy of a person’s religious beliefs.[15] In support of this
holding, the Court explained:
Freedom of thought, which includes
freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the
right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are
rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths … Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of
mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law … If one
could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those
teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom. The Fathers
of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of
religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of
any one religious creed on which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter
of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting
views. Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was
granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the
verity of his religious views. The religious views espoused by respondents
might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth
or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.
When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. [16]
As the Court
emphasized, “the First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type
of religion for preferred treatment,” but rather “puts them all in that
position.”[17]
Thus, the free exercise
clause protects all religious beliefs, provided that one sincerely holds those beliefs. As Justice Neil Gorsuch has
explained, the free exercise clause extends protection to “any ‘performance of
or abstention from physical acts’ that a sincere claimant connects to his
religion.’” As such, “there is no room for courts to determine whether the
exercise at issue is ‘illogical’ or otherwise not ‘central’ or ‘fundamental’ to
or ‘compelled’ by his faith”; as long as the claimant is sincere, he has the right to ‘draw… a line ruling
in or out a particular exercise.”[18]
Judicially
Created Religious Exemptions
The Supreme Court has
recently addressed whether private and public organizations may refuse to
provide services if doing so would violate their religious beliefs. This
remains an unresolved area of the law and requires balancing a person’s
interest in freely exercising his or her religion against the government’s
interest in requiring all people to comply with the law.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, a closely-held corporation refused,
on the basis of its religious beliefs, to comply with a federal regulation
adopted pursuant to the Affordable Care Act that required corporations to offer
contraception coverage for female employees.[19] In a 5-4 decision, the
Court did not directly address whether the regulation violated the free exercise
clause. Instead, the Court issued a narrow decision, holding that closely-held
corporations may, based on religious beliefs, claim exemptions from federal
regulations if there exists a less
restrictive means to accomplish the government’s objective without infringing
on religious beliefs.[20]
However, the Court did
not decide the broader question of whether the regulation would, if no less
restrictive means were available, violate the free exercise clause.
In Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the Court also refused
to decide whether a business owner must comply with anti-discrimination laws
that violate the owner’s religious beliefs. Rather, the Court focused on the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s decision, which demonstrated hostility
toward the owner’s religious beliefs.[21]
Ultimately, this discussion highlights the legal principles that the Court has developed when interpreting the free exercise clause. Specifically:
1. Although religious beliefs receive the highest degree of constitutional protection under the free exercise clause, the government may restrict religious practices in some instances;
2. Laws that target, disparately impact, or show animus toward a particular religion or religious belief, violate the free exercise clause;
3. Generally applicable laws may violate the free exercise clause if they “substantially burden” religion;
4. Neither legislatures nor courts may assess the validity or legitimacy of particular religious beliefs; and
5. The balance between respecting customers’ right to receive services and business owners’ right to refuse services to individuals based on religious beliefs remains unresolved.
In
our next module, we will look at the application of establishment clause
analysis in specific contexts.
[2] Id.
supra (emphasis added).
[4] Id.
[6] Id.
supra.
[8] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
(internal citation omitted).
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Sean Janda, Judge Gorsuch and Free Exercise (2017) (quoting Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th
Cir. 2014)).
[20] Id.
[21] Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd., supra note 7.