Law Enforcement and Methods to Combat Terrorism - Module 3 of 5
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Module 3: Law Enforcement and Methods to Combat Terrorism
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States, the nation’s counter-terrorism strategy consists of using both
military force and law enforcement methods to prevent, disrupt, neutralize, and
punish terrorists and those who support terrorism.[1]
The Roles of Government in Counter-terrorism
All three branches of government
collaborate in applying the law enforcement paradigm to stop terrorism and
ensure the integrity of the rule of law. First is the legislative branch.
Congress enacts federal laws criminalizing terrorism and the support of
terrorism. These laws authorize the executive and judicial branches of
government to apply the law enforcement paradigm to counter-terrorism.
Second is the executive branch. The
Constitution of the United States obligates the President and executive branch
employees to faithfully execute laws governing counter-terrorism. The
primary departments that enforce laws to combat terrorism are the Departments
of Justice, State, Homeland Security and Treasury. Counter-terrorism roles and
missions are further developed and defined by inter-agency collaboration. The
intelligence community, consisting of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
National Security Agency, provide support and work with the principal
investigative agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Finally, the judicial branch
determines legal rights and duties of all involved parties. Courts are the
forum for prosecuting alleged terrorists, though they must also balance the
interests of the government and rights of the accused.
In this module, we will identify
the counter-terrorism roles and missions of agencies and departments that
operate under the law enforcement paradigm and we will then examine and
evaluate specific tools in their arsenals.
Executive departments and agencies
involved in law enforcement play specialized counter-terrorism roles and
undertake missions established by statutes, executive orders, and presidential
and inter-agency decisions. Let’s examine the roles of these departments and agencies.
The State Department determines
which groups qualify as terrorist organizations and cooperates internationally
in counter-terrorism. The FBI and National Security Administration use
investigative techniques to identify and monitor terrorists. The Department of
Homeland Security prevents terrorists from entering or staying in the United
States. The Department of Justice detains and prosecutes terrorists and their
supporters. Finally, the Department of Treasury cuts off sources financing
terrorism.
Although these departments and
agencies have unique roles and missions, they collaborate in applying the tools
and resources available to government to prevent and punish terrorism. In
practice, the law enforcement paradigm consists of eight counter-terrorism functions:
(1) designation of a group as a
foreign terrorist organization;
(2) immigration control and
deportation;
(3) surveillance;
(4) profiling;
(5) detention;
(6) extradition; and
(7) prosecution.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act permits the State Department to designate a group as a “foreign
terrorist organization” when it finds all of the following elements:
(1) the organization is a foreign
entity;
(2) the organization engages in
terrorist activity, terrorism, or material
support of terrorism, or retains
the capacity and intent to engage in terrorism; and
(3) the terrorist activity or
terrorism threatens the security of U.S. citizens or the
national security of the United
States.[2]
The Secretary of State consults
with the Attorney General to apply these criteria to compile a list of
questionable organizations and to then designate foreign terrorist
organizations. Groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations include
al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, the Irish Republican Army, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia and over fifty others.[3]
Anyone who supports a group
designated as a foreign terrorist organization is put “on notice.” Supporting
one in any way is illegal and the U.S. government can block foreign terrorist
organization funds that are in the control of United States financial
institutions. Title 8, Section 1189(a)(8) prohibits a criminal defendant from
challenging a designation because Congress intended to delegate this exclusive
power to the Secretary of State to make a designation and to remove the subject
from judicial review.[4]
For example, In United States v.
Hammoud, a Lebanese national appealed his conviction for providing cash and
equipment to Hezbollah, a designated foreign terrorist organization. He claimed
that the prohibition against challenging the State Department’s designation of
Hezbollah violated his Constitutional right to a jury determination of guilt on
every element of the charged offense. The Fourth Circuit found that the
question of whether the designation of Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist
organization was valid was expressly precluded from judicial review by
statute.[5]
While a criminal defendant may not
challenge the designation, the organization itself may challenge its own
designation, but getting the designation reversed in court is difficult. A
court can only reverse a designation if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Moreover, the
organization does not have the right to be informed of the precise nature of
the evidence against it. The court renders its decision based solely on the
“administrative record” that was created unilaterally by the Department of
State. A designation may be set aside if it lacks “substantial support in the
administrative record as a whole or in classified information submitted to the
court.” [6]
Immigration Control and
Deportation
Any non-citizen who engages in,
incites, endorses, or persuades others to engage in terrorism, is a member of a
foreign terrorist organization, or is likely to engage in terrorism if admitted
to the U.S., is inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act.[7]
Recently, the United States denied
an entry visa to Gerry Adams, an Irish national and president of the Irish
Republican Army, an organization that had engaged in terrorism in the United
Kingdom, because of Adams’ advocacy of and personal involvement in terrorism.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the denial of Adams’ visa, holding the State
Department’s determination that Adams’ advocacy of and personal involvement
with IRA terrorist violence was a legitimate, good-faith reason for denial.[8]
Additionally, aliens whom the Department
of Justice believes are a danger to the security of the United States, have
engaged in or are likely to engage in terrorism or are members of a foreign
terrorist organization, can be denied asylum and deported.[9]
Moreover, a court cannot review a determination that an alien is removable on this basis.[10] Mouloud Bellout, an Algerian citizen and member of the Armed Islamic Group, a State Department listed foreign terrorist organization, attempted to enter the U.S. at Los Angeles International Airport using a fraudulent Belgian passport. After the agency now known as Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated removal proceedings, Bellout applied for asylum and petitioned to stop the deportation, alleging that he would be tortured by Algerian police or terrorists if he were deported to Algeria. The Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Bellout’s claims because the relevant statute prohibited judicial review, deferring to the determination by the Attorney General that Bellout was a “danger to the security of the United States” based on his membership in a foreign terrorist organization.[11]
Methods
of Identifying Terrorists
Surveillance
The USA PATRIOT Act,[12] enacted in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, enhanced the federal government’s authority to
conduct surveillance, intercept communications and gather information to
prevent terrorism and prosecute terrorists. Various sections of the Act allow
the federal government to:
·
seize records from internet service providers and libraries on an FBI
certification that the records are sought in connection with a foreign
intelligence investigation;[13]
·
conduct broad electronic surveillance of suspected terrorists as part of
foreign counterintelligence operations;
·
share information collected on a terrorist suspect with prosecutors
provided there is “no substantial likelihood” that communications of a “U.S.
person” will be collected;
·
execute nationwide rather than particularized counterterrorism search
warrants; and
·
collect information about suspected terrorists from financial
institutions without probable cause so long as there is reason to believe the target
is the agent of a foreign power or foreign terrorist organization.
One of the most significant aspects
of the PATRIOT Act is that it amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, broadening the FBI and NSA’s ability to share information gathered from
electronic eavesdropping and surveillance with federal prosecutors. Thanks to
evidence collected from surveillance and information sharing authorized by
statutes, federal prosecutors have successfully prosecuted terrorists on
numerous occasions. Prosecutors may not have been successful in doing so had
they have had to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s requirements for obtaining
a warrant.[14]
In U.S. v. Sami Al-Arian, federal
prosecutors used extensive communications intercepted under the authority of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as amended by the PATRIOT Act to
prove that Al-Arian, a University of South Florida professor, had provided
material support to the Palestinian terror group, Islamic Jihad.[15] Despite
privacy and civil liberties concerns, courts have upheld the constitutionality
of the use of intelligence-related surveillance to support counterterrorism
prosecutions.[16]
Profiling
The federal government engages in
two forms of profiling to prevent terror attacks. The first is demographic
profiling, defined as focusing investigative resources on people from countries
in which terrorism originates. Profiling to find people who fit the demographic
criteria of most terrorists is controversial but lawful, unless someone prosecuted
as the result of its use can prove that law enforcement had no probable cause
to make an arrest and/or that a discriminatory purpose motivated the government
to arrest him.[17] After 9/11, the FBI and major city police departments used
demographic profiling to survey, question, and detain aliens from
Muslim-majority countries, sparking claims of discrimination. In
response, the DOJ published “Guidance on the Use of Race by Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies” which, while prohibiting demographic profiling in
“traditional law enforcement activities,” permits federal law enforcement
officers to engage in demographic profiling while “investigating or preventing
threats to national security” up to any Constitutional or statutory limits.[18]
Behavioral profiling is defined as
focusing investigative resources on people acting in patterns similar to those
employed by known terrorists, thereby creating a reasonable inference of
involvement in terrorist activity. This has greater political support and less
legal risk than demographic profiling because it looks at behaviors that
correlate with historical instances of terrorists’ behaviors rather than
immutable characteristics such as race, gender, or ethnicity.[19]
Nevertheless, civil rights groups
are attempting to end to all profiling. In early 2018, one group filed a
lawsuit, Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, challenges
alleged demographic profiling and harassment of Muslim travelers.[20] In
Hassan v. City of New York, Muslim rights advocates alleged the that NYPD
Intelligence Bureau had developed a “human mapping system” that monitored
Muslims along the East Coast and “infiltrated almost every aspect of Muslim
life, from mosques and student associations, to halal butcher shops and restaurants,
to private citizens.”[21] Without admitting wrongdoing, the NYPD agreed
to pay $75,000 and revise its profiling policies.[22]
Temporary
Detention - Administrative and Material Witness
Detention of a potential terrorist
or a person who poses a threat to United States national security is divided
into two categories. The first is administrative detention, which is protective
rather than punitive. Under the PATRIOT Act it can be extended as long as the
terrorist remains a danger to national security as certified by the Attorney
General, in six month intervals.[23]
In the 2001 case of Zadvydas v.
Davis, the petitioner, an ethnic Lithuanian drug trafficker, argued that his
indefinite administrative detention in the U.S. violated his constitutional
rights. The Supreme Court held that although the government must generally
release an administrative detainee after a reasonable time to safeguard his
constitutionally-protected interest in liberty, a “small segment of
particularly dangerous individuals” [24] can be held indefinitely due to the
dangers they pose. Later cases have confirmed that terrorists may be classified
as “particularly dangerous individuals” and can be administratively detained
indefinitely.
Section 412(a) of the PATRIOT Act,
enacted after Zadyvdas, adds Section 236A to the Immigration and Nationality
Act, allowing the Attorney General, with the assistance of DHS and State and
local law enforcement, to take into administrative detention any alien
certified inadmissible or deportable on one of six grounds, including terrorist
activities and any other activity that “endangers the security of the United
States.”[25] Although Section 412(a)(5) then requires the government to begin
criminal or deportation proceedings within seven days, Section 412(a)(6)
permits it to indefinitely detain certified illegal alien terrorists unlikely
to be deported due to continuing investigations for up to six months.[26]
Further, the government is not obligated to release identities of suspected
terrorists.[27]
The second type of temporary
detention is a material witness detention. Under the federal material witness
statute, if the testimony of a person is important in a criminal proceeding or
even a grand jury investigation, and a subpoena is unlikely to secure the
presence of that person to testify, a court may order the arrest and detention
of that person.[28]
Osama Awadallah, a Jordanian living
in California, spent three months in detention under the material witness
statute because he had associated with, and had information regarding, two
terrorists responsible for the September 11th attacks and was likely to flee to
Jordan unless detained.[29] Awadallah was released on bail only after
testifying before the grand jury about the hijackers.
The Second Circuit held that
Awadallah’s detention under the material witness statute to secure his grand
jury testimony, was “reasonable under the circumstances” and did not violate
Awadallah’s constitutional rights despite the temporary deprivation of his
liberty.[30]
Someone detained as a material
witness can subsequently be detained as an unlawful combatant. One
example is that of Jose Padilla, arrested in Chicago in May 2002 on suspicion
of plotting a “dirty bomb” attack and initially detained on a material witness
warrant. A court refused to grant his habeas corpus petition to release him.
Later on, he was charged as an unlawful combatant and detained in military
prison for years[31] before being tried and convicted in federal court.[32]
Civil libertarians have criticized
this tactic to combat terrorism. They fear that material witness detention is
used as a form of administrative detention where the government has
insufficient evidence to establish that a detainee is a threat to national
security or to buy time to develop criminal charges for which probable cause to
detain has not been established.
Extradition and Prosecution
Terror suspects who are not within
the United States’ jurisdiction are often indicted before they are
detained. In 1998, Osama bin Laden was indicted by a grand jury in
Manhattan for conspiring in the bombing of American embassies in Nairobi and
Dar es Salaam and killing U.S. citizens, but the U.S. could not secure the
cooperation of Sudan or Afghanistan in detaining and transferring him to the
U.S. for trial.[33]
Extradition is the judicially
approved and diplomatically directed procedure to detain and transfer a suspect
from one country to another for prosecution. Terrorism is universally regarded
as a crime, and, provided an extradition treaty is in place, a request approved
by a federal judge and transmitted from the Department of State to the foreign
ministry of the country where the suspect is located requesting extradition of
a terrorism suspect is usually granted. In 2017, Spain, based on an
extradition treaty with the U.S., extradited Ali Charaf Damache, an
Algerian-Irish dual citizen and suspected al-Qaeda terrorist, to stand trial in
federal court in Philadelphia after he was indicted in 2011 for conspiracy to
provide material support to terrorists and identity theft to facilitate
international terrorism.[34]
Sections 2331 through 2339 of Title
18 of the U.S. Code define, authorize prosecution of, and impose criminal
penalties up to and including death for anyone who commits “terrorism.”[35] Yet
most acts that satisfy the legal definition of terrorism are prosecuted as more
traditional crimes, such as homicide, aircraft piracy and destruction,
destruction by explosives, use of a weapon of mass destruction and conspiracy
to commit murder.
Successful counterterrorism
convictions have included the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing,[36] the bombers of U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998,[37] the would-be
20th 9/11 hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui,[38] and the “American Taliban,” John
Walker Lindh, who conspired to kill Americans and provided services to al-Qaeda
and the Taliban.[39]
The Material Support Statute, which
criminalizes providing money, training, equipment, personnel, transportation,
services, physical assets, or “expert advice or assistance” to terrorists and
terrorist organizations, is the most powerful law for prosecuting
terrorists.[40] Courts have allowed this statute to be used to deny terrorist
organizations access to financial and human capital by imposing civil
liability.[41] The prohibition against providing terrorist groups material
support is so broad that it prohibits training and advising terrorists in the
law of armed conflict, even where experts providing these services lack any
intent to further terrorist activities.[42].
Convictions for Material Support
Statute violations have disrupted terrorist organizations’ resources, limiting
their capacity to execute attacks in the United States while deterring others
from joining their ranks. In one case, U.S. v. Mehanna, a U.S. citizen, Tarek
Mehanna, the “media wing” of al-Qaeda in the U.S., was convicted of providing
material support to al-Qaeda by translating, interpreting, and distributing
materials promoting jihad against the United States.[43]
In another case, U.S. v. Sattar, a
court convicted Lynne Stewart, the lawyer for Omar Abdel Rahman, the mastermind
of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, for providing material support by
sending encrypted messages indicating Rahman’s approval of further terrorist
attacks.[44]
In our next module, we will move
away from the law enforcement paradigm and discuss non-criminal sanctions
against terrorists such as domestic economic sanctions and the potential civil
liability of terrorists and terrorist organizations for their acts.
[1] Off. of Pres., National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011). https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf
[5] U.S. v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8))
[6] Joey Shabot, Transacting Terror: The Regulation of Terrorist Financing and Procedural Due Process, 1, 5, http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/3)Shabot-GinsburgEssay.pdf (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3)).
[8] Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 649 (1st Cir. 1990).
[9] 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(4)(B).
[10] 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(D).
[11] Bellout v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2004).
[13] PATRIOT Act, supra note 12, at § 215 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §1861).
[15] U.S. v. Sami Amin Al-Arian, 308 F.Supp.2d 1322, (M.D. Fla. 2004); FBI Charges Florida Professor With Terrorist Activities, CNN (Feb. 20, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/South/02/20/professor.arrest/.
[16] In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 728 (FIS Ct. Review 2002); Jeremy D. Bailie, The Constitutionality of the Patriot Act, 4 Inquiries 1 (2012).
[17] Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003); Samuel L Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1413 (2002).
[18] U.S. Department of Justice, Guidance for Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Regarding their Use of Race, Ethnicity,Gender, National Origin, Religion, Sexual Orientation, or Gender Identity3-4 (December 2014),
[24] Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691 (2001).
[25] PATRIOT Act, supra note 12, at § 412(a).
[28] 18 U.S.C. §3144.
[29] Ray Rivera & Matthew Sweeney, Acquaintance of 2 Hijackers is Acquitted, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/18/nyregion/18immigrant.html
[30] US v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003).
[31] Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-32 (2004).
[33] United States v. bin Laden, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Indictment No. S(9) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998), https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/us_indictment_against_bin_laden.pdf.
[34] Algerian-born Irish Citizen Extradited to US on Terror Charges, Irish Times (June 22, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/algerian-born-irish-citizen-extradited-to-us-on-terror-charges-1.3163954; Rebecca R. Ruiz, et. al., Terror Suspect Brought to U.S. for Trial, Breaking From Trump Rhetoric, N.Y. Times (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/world/europe/al-qaeda-suspect-court-trump-sessions-guantanamo.html.
[36] U.S.v. Salameh, 261 F.3d. 271 (2d Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
[37] U.S.v. Bin Laden et al., 109 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
[39] U.S.v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002)
[40] 18 U.S.C. § 2339A-D (2012).
[41] Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002)
[42] Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2010).
[44] U.S. v. Sattar et al., 314 F. Supp.2d 279, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).