Distinctiveness: Module 3 of 5
See Also:
Module
3: Distinctiveness
Now that we’ve covered the basics of trademarks under
federal and state law, we will turn to the nuances of what may be protected. In
this module, we’ll cover the requirement of “distinctiveness” for something to
be covered by trademark protection.
Levels
of Distinctiveness
To be eligible for federal trademark registration, a mark
must have a certain level of distinctiveness. The degree of distinctiveness
runs along a continuum, generally categorized into one of five groups.
The first level includes generic terms, which are considered
the least distinctive and the least deserving of trademark protection.
Second, are descriptive terms. Third, are suggestive terms.
Fourth, are arbitrary terms. Finally, the fifth level is fanciful terms,
which are considered the most distinctive and the most deserving of trademark
protection.[1]
A generic term is one that the public
understands as a common name for the company’s goods or services.[2]
Generic terms cannot be registered on either the Principal or Supplemental
Register. For example, a company could not register the term watch for
its timepieces, or the term automobile for its cars, or the
term popcorn for its snack products. The trademark
examiner can obtain evidence of the public’s understanding of the term from any
competent source, including dictionaries, online databases, newspapers and
other publications.[3] Based on these sources, for example, an examiner
determined that churrascos was a generic term for restaurant
services.[4]
A mark is considered descriptive if it
conveys an immediate idea of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function,
feature, purpose or use of the specified goods or services.[5]
Descriptive terms are generally not eligible for trademark registration unless
they have acquired secondary meanings. Examples of descriptive terms
include sharp for televisions, international business machines for
computers, and cold and creamy for ice cream.[6] The
determination of whether a mark is descriptive must be made in conjunction with
the specific good or service and the significance that the mark would have to
the average purchaser.[7]
Suggestive marks are those that “require
imagination, thought or perception to reach a conclusion” as to the nature of
the product.[8] For example, the mark term noburst for
liquid antifreeze was determined to suggest the desired result of using the
product rather than immediately informing the public of an attribute of the
product.[9] Examples of other suggestive marks include airbus for
airplanes and jaguar for cars.[10] Suggestive marks are
considered “inherently distinctive” and can be registered.[11]
Arbitrary marks include words that are in common
use, but that are not typically used to describe a significant ingredient,
quality or characteristic of the product. In other words, arbitrary marks
use common terms in an unexpected manner. For example, the mark veuve --
which is French for widow -- was found to be an arbitrary term
as applied to champagne.[12] Other examples of arbitrary marks
include apple for computers and old crow for whiskey.[13]
Arbitrary marks are also considered inherently distinctive and can be
registered.[14]
Fanciful marks are terms that have been invented
for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark. Examples of fanciful
marks include Exxon for gasoline and Pepsi for
beverages.[15] Fanciful marks are considered the most distinctive and,
thus, the worthiest of trademark protection.[16]
Applications
of Distinctiveness
Sometimes it is difficult to correctly classify the level
of distinctiveness for a certain term. A term that falls into one
category of distinctiveness for a certain product might fall into a different
category for a different product. Moreover, based on usage over time, a
mark might shift into a different category.
It can also be difficult to
categorize the level of distinctiveness of certain terms. The most
difficult determination often involves terms that are on the borderline between
suggestive and descriptive. The determination is important, because
suggestive terms can inherently be registered, whereas descriptive terms
require analysis before they can be registered.
For example, the Trademark Office initially refused to
register the term dotblog in conjunction with internet
service, finding that the term was merely descriptive of a website log or blog.
The appellate court reversed the decision, concluding that the mark was
suggestive.[17] According to the court, dotblog is not
descriptive because it does not immediately convey knowledge
of a quality, feature, function or characteristic of the goods or services with
which it is used.
Incongruity is one of the accepted bases for determining
that a mark is suggestive rather than descriptive.[18] For example, the
Trademark Office determined that frankwurst was suggestive.[19]
Although frank is synonymous with hot dog, and wurst is
synonymous with sausage, the combination of the terms was found to be
incongruous. Another example is the mark mouse house for
museum services featuring mice figurines made to look like humans.[20]
The Trademark Office found this usage incongruous with the more likely meaning
of mouse house -- a building in which mice are housed or
displayed.
Another difficult distinction involves whether a term
is descriptive or generic. The distinction
is important because descriptive terms can eventually be registered if they
acquire secondary meanings. Generic terms cannot be registered under any
circumstances.[21]
For example, the Trademark Office decided that the
term buyautoparts was merely generic when applied to a website
selling automotive parts.[22] The term was found to be generic because
the relevant consumers would understand that the term generally applies to the
entire category of automotive part retailers.
As another example, the term bundt was
found to be generic for a type of ring cake mix, based on cookbooks and
food-related news articles.[23] In contrast, the term corn thins was
found to be descriptive of corn cakes, and rice thins to be
descriptive of rice cakes.[24] The appellate court upheld the Trademark
Office’s decision, because corn and rice described
the ingredients, and thins described the physical
characteristics of the snacks.
Inherent and Acquired Distinctiveness
Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are
often referred to as “inherently distinctive.” Such marks can be
registered. Generic and descriptive terms are not typically eligible for
trademark protection. However, such terms can be protected by a trademark
registration if they have become distinctive by achieving what is known as
a secondary meaning. For example, sharp is
merely a descriptive term for televisions, but it has achieved a secondary
meaning through long use, advertising and publicity.[25] Likewise, the
phrase International Business Machines is merely a descriptive
term for some computers, but IBM was able to register the trademark after the
term had achieved a secondary meaning.
A determination of secondary meaning requires that the
primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not
the product, but the producer.[26] The public
must associate the goods with a single source, even if the source is
anonymous. For example, the descriptive term coppertone was
found to have acquired a secondary meaning.[27] The general public
understood that coppertone suntan lotion was made by a single
producer, even if the public did not know that Douglas Laboratories was that
producer. In contrast, Kellogg’s was not able to register a trademark for
the term shredded wheat, despite exclusive use for over 30 years
and over $17 million in advertising.[28] The court found that the
consuming public associated shredded wheat primarily with the
product and not with Kellogg’s cereal product.
Evidence that is typically used to establish secondary
meaning includes prior registrations of the same mark for similar goods or
services, verified statements that the mark has exclusively and continuously
been used with the goods or services for at least five years and large-scale
advertising expenditures.[29] However, as Kellogg’s learned, even
long-term use and significant advertising expenses do not necessarily mean that
a descriptive term has acquired a secondary meaning.
Other evidence of secondary meaning may include surveys,
market research and customer reaction studies.[30] The surveys must show
that consumers view the proposed mark as an indication of the source of the
particular product.[31] Although every case is evaluated on its own
merits, courts have held that survey results showing less than 10% customer
recognition are insufficient to establish secondary meaning, and results over
50% are typically sufficient.[32] It is often difficult to develop a
statistically-accurate customer survey, and courts often dismiss survey results
due to flaws in questions or in selecting the appropriate survey group.[33]
Regardless, surveys and market research remain vital evidence of secondary
meaning in many trademark cases.
Mis-Descriptive
Terms
As we’ve discussed, trademark law prohibits the
registration of terms that are merely descriptive, such as cold and creamy for
ice cream. Trademark law also prohibits registration of terms that are
deceptively mis-descriptive.[34] A mis-descriptive term is one that
conveys an immediate idea of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function
or feature of a product, but where the implied or conveyed idea is false.[35]
For the Trademark Office to refuse registration, the mis-description must be
deceptive, meaning that consumers are likely to believe the
mis-description. An example of a deceptively mis-descriptive mark is the
term organik (ending with a K), when used on clothing made
from non-organic materials.[36] The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
found that prospective purchasers were likely to believe that goods identified
by this mark were 100% cotton that is either from an organically grown plant or
that had not been chemically-treated. The Board further found that this
mistaken belief was likely to affect the decision to purchase among a
significant number of prospective purchasers.
However, as with generic descriptions, even
mis-descriptive marks that have acquired a secondary meaning can be registered.[37]
In addition, marks that contain appropriately registrable matter in addition to
deceptively mis-descriptive components can be registered with a disclaimer of
the deceptive component.[38] A disclaimer is a statement that the
trademark applicant does not claim exclusive rights to the unregistrable
portion of the mark.[39] For example, if the maker of organik clothing
put a disclaimer on its advertising that said something like “organik clothing
is not made from materials that would normally qualify as organic,” it would have
had a better case for registration.
Geographically
Descriptive Terms
Next, an owner cannot typically register a term that is
primarily geographically descriptive.[40] For example, while
a pizza shop may certainly describe its product as being “New York pizza,” it
cannot trademark that phrase, because it is merely descriptive of a geographic
origin or style.
The focus is on the word “primarily.” The Trademark
Office employs a three-step test for refusal to register a geographically
descriptive mark.[41] First, the primary significance of
the mark must be a generally known geographic location. A mark is not
primarily geographic where the geographic meaning is minor, obscure, remote or
unconnected with the goods or services.[42] Second, the goods or services
must originate from that location. Third, purchasers must be likely to
believe that the goods or services originate from that location. Based on
this test, the Trademark Office has rejected registration of Yosemite
beer[43] and Carolina apparel.[44]
In the Yosemite beer case, the Trademark
Office considered a beer that was produced and sold in a brewpub in Merced,
California, which is approximately 80 miles from Yosemite. The Office
determined that the primary significance of the Yosemite beer mark
was Yosemite, which is the shorthand term for an internationally-recognized
geographic location, Yosemite National Park. The Trademark Office also
determined that Merced was close enough to Yosemite, and that Merced was
sufficiently affiliated with Yosemite, to satisfy the second part of the
test. Finally, the Office determined that consumers would reasonably
believe that the beer came from or near Yosemite. As such, the term was
considered geographically descriptive and thus ineligible for registration.
Similarly, an owner cannot register a geographically
deceptively mis-descriptive mark.[45] This includes terms used with goods
or services that do not originate from the place identified in the mark, but
when consumers believe that they do and buy the products as a result. For
example, the Trademark Office rejected Venezia-Milano for
women’s clothing made in China, because consumers would likely believe that the
product originated from Italy.[46] Similarly, the Venice collection
was held to be geographically deceptively mis-descriptive of goods that did not
originate from Venice[47], and Havana select was
geographically deceptively mis-descriptive of rum that did not originate from
Cuba.[48]
Similar to other descriptive marks, if a geographically
descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning, it can be registered as a
trademark. But remember that geographically deceptively
mis-descriptive marks are not eligible for any trademark
protection, even if they have acquired a secondary meaning.[49] So, for
example, Samuel Adams Boston Lager can be trademarked because it was created
and is brewed in Boston and has acquired a distinct secondary meaning.[50] But
the phrase would not be eligible for trademark protection if the beer were
founded and brewed in, say, Denver.
Another exception is that indications of regional
origin are eligible for registration as certification marks.[51]
A geographic certification mark is a term used to certify that the goods or
services originate in the geographical region identified by the term.[52]
For example, Parmigiano Reggiano is a certification mark that
designates cheese from a specific region in Italy.[53]
Surnames
A term that is primarily merely a surname (as
in “Williamson’s grits” to describe grits sold by a person named Williamson)
cannot be registered unless it has acquired a secondary meaning.[54] The
test for whether it is primarily merely a surname depends on the significance
of the term to consumers. In making this determination, telephone directories,
online databases and the U.S. census database can be used, including evidence
that the surname is not in such sources.[55] A court has found that
evidence that a surname appeared in 21 telephone listings and 11 excerpts from
a research database was insufficient to show that the mark was primarily merely
a surname.[56]
Evidence of the fame of a mark is not typically relevant
in determining whether the mark is primarily merely a surname.[57] For
example, the fact that McDonald’s was famous due to widespread promotion and
advertising did not mean that McDonald was not primarily merely a surname.[58]
Of course, such evidence would be important to establish secondary meaning
after the clearing the first hurdle. In other words, McDonald’s can be
registered because it’s acquired an independent meaning but could not be
registered merely because the product is run by someone named McDonald.
Rare surnames are more likely to receive trademark
protection than common surnames.[59] For example, the surname Sava was
found sufficiently rare that it was not “primarily merely a surname.”[60]
However, even a rare surname may be considered primarily a surname if its
primary significance to consumers is that of a surname.[61] For this
reason, the marks Darty, Rebo and Posten could
not be registered.[62] The same goes for rare surnames of famous
personalities, such as Belushi.[63]
Still, if there is a commonly understood meaning of a
term apart from its surname significance, then the surname can be
trademarked. Such terms can be registered if they have acquired secondary
meaning. For example, Bird and Hunt were
entitled to trademark registration.[64] Likewise, surnames that identify
historical places or persons might not be considered primarily surnames.[65]
For example, the name Da Vinci was entitled to protection,
because it primarily connoted a famous figure, Leonardo Da Vinci.[66] John
Deere, of course, is also entitled to trademark protection even though it has
the same name as the 19th century inventor who invented the steel plow.
In our next modules, we’ll focus on ensuring that there
is no trademark infringement and look at trademark enforcement actions and
remedies.
[1] Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
HuntingWorld, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
[2] In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating
Corp.,240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
[3] Trademark Manual of Examining
Procedure (TMEP) § 1209.01(c)(i).
[4] In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594 (Fed.Cir. 2016).
[5] In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217
(Fed.Cir. 1987).
[6] https://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkStrengthFactSheet.aspx
[7] In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297,
1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217,1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
[8] TMEP § 1209.01(a).
[9] In
re The Noble Co., 225 USPQ 749 (TTAB 1985)
[10] https://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkStrengthFactSheet.aspx
[11] TMEP § 1209.01(b).
[13] TMEP § 1209.01(a).
[14] TMEP § 1209.01(b).
[15] https://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkStrengthFactSheet.aspx; TMEP § 1209.01(a)- both
products specified on this source
[16] TMEP § 1209.01(b).
Still 1209.01(a) and/or https://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkStrengthFactSheet.aspx?
[17] In re Driven Innovations, Inc, 674
F.App'x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
[18] TMEP § 1209.01(a).
[19] In
re Vienna Sausage Mfg. Co., 156 USPQ 155, 156 (TTAB 1967)
[20] In
re Getz Found., 227 USPQ 571, 572 (TTAB 1985)
[21] https://www.upcounsel.com/generic-trademark
[22] In
re Meridian Rack & Pinion DBA buyautoparts.com, 114 USPQ2d 1462 (TTAB
April 21, 2015)
[23] In re Northland Aluminum Products,
Inc.,777 F.2d 1556, 227 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
[24] Real Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N.
Am.,Inc., 906 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
[25] http://www.inta.org/trademarkbasics/factsheets/pages/trademarkstrengthfactsheet.aspx.
[27] Douglas Labs. Corp. v. Copper Tan,
Inc.,108 F. Supp. 837, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
[28] Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305U.S. 111, 118
(1938)
[29] TMEP § 1212.
[30] TMEP § 1212.06(d).
[31] Nextel
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1393, 1402-03 (TTAB 2009)
[32] Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons
Ammonia Co.,299 F.2d 855, 862, 132 USPQ 627, 633 (C.C.P.A. 1962)
[33] TMEP § 1212.06(d).
[34] 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1).
[35] TMEP § 1209.04.
[36] In re Organik Techs., Inc., 41 USPQ2d1690 (TTAB 1997).
[37] TMEP § 1209.04.
[38] TMEP § 1209.04.
[39] https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws-regulations/how-satisfy-disclaimer-requirement.
[40] 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(2).
[41] TMEP § 1210.01(a).
[42] In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1300,
52USPQ2d 1539, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
[43] In
re Spirits of New Merced, LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1614 (TTAB 2007).
[44] In
re Carolina Apparel, 48 USPQ2d 1542 (TTAB 1998).
[45] TMEP § 1210.01(b).
[46] In
re Tigerland-Foxland of NY, Inc., Serial No. 85130889, July 23, 2014.
[47] In re Save Venice New York Inc.,
259F.3d 1346, 59 USPQ2d 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
[48] In re Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 48
USPQ2d1031 (TTAB 1997)
[49] TMEP § 1210.01(b).
[50] https://www.brewbound.com/news/boston-beer-company-releases-samuel-adams-sam-76
[51] 15 U.S.C.§ 1054.
[52] TMEP § 1306.05(a).
[53] https://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=3664.
[54] TMEP § 1211.
[55] TMEP §1211.02(b)(i)-(vi).
[56] In
re BDH Two Inc., 26 USPQ2d 1556, 1558 (TTAB 1993).
[57] TMEP §1211.02(b)(vii).
[58] In
re McDonald’s Corp., 230 USPQ 304, 307 (TTAB 1986)
[59] TMEP §1211.01(a)(v).
[60] In
re Sava Research Corp., 32 USPQ2d 1380, 1381 (TTAB 1994).
[61] TMEP §1211.01(a)(v).
[62] TMEP §1211.01(a)(v).
[63] In
re Bed & Bars Ltd., 122 USPQ2d, 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2017).
[64] TMEP §1211.01(a)(i).
[65] TMEP §1211.01(a)(iv).