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Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees that people will be safe from
unreasonable searches and seizures.[1] In the Supreme Court case, Katz v United States,[2] the Court developed
the idea of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” The Katz case dealt with a wiretap on a
public phone booth as police attempted to thwart a gambling ring. The Court stated that there was an
expectation of privacy in a phone conversation, even if that conversation took
place in a public phone booth.
The Court also ruled,
though, that anything that a person knowingly exposes to the public, regardless
of location, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. A person must keep something private for the
Fourth Amendment to apply.
To determine whether
there exists a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a two-prong test has been
established.
First, the person must
show a “subjective” expectation that his activities or items would be private.
Second, the individual
must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one which society
considers reasonable.[3]
To illustrate how this
test works, let’s consider cases in which there is and is not a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
People have reasonable
expectations of privacy in their own person, house, vehicles, and business
offices. They also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal
communications such as telephone calls, letters, and journals. Moreover, if a person needs a key or password
to gain entry into a space, whether they are physical or electronic, there is
also an expectation of privacy in that space. Examples here include cell
phones, computers, bank safety deposit boxes, lockers, and luggage.
In contrast, people have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in public spaces where their actions, possessions can be seen or conversations heard, again whether the
content at issue is physical or virtual.
Some examples of such places are public sidewalks, venues hosting sporting
events and public parks. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded
garbage left in the street. Electronically,
there is also no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed, in
the GPS location of a vehicle, electronic bank records, communications via the
Internet, including e-mail, chat room or social media, in files accessible
through file sharing software, in information provided by customers to Internet
providers, including identifying address information.[4]
A person also has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in odors emanating from one’s person or
luggage. This is why, for example, a police officer who smells alcohol on a
driver’s breath may use that fact as evidence against the driver. In fact, a
2005 United States Supreme Court decision ruled that police dogs trained to
sniff narcotics that indicate the presence of narcotics in a car could provide
the probable cause necessary to allow police to search the vehicle.[5]
Furthermore, a
passenger in a car has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
that car.[6] So, for example, if a
vehicle’s driver consents to the search of a car, materials found in the car
that belong to a passenger can be used against that passenger. The driver, on
the other hand, does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of the vehicle and thus can refuse police permission to search the vehicle
(unless the police otherwise have a legal right to search it).
By the same token,
while a homeowner (or renter) has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of the home, a guest in a house has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in that house.[7] If the home owner consents to allow police to
search a house, the possessions of the guests in that house are fair game.
Even in places and in
items where there is generally a reasonable expectation of privacy, exceptions
exist. For example, even within one’s
home or property, the “open-field” doctrine provides that if something on a
person’s property is easily visible to the public without the need to be physically
on the property (e.g., from the air from the street) then there is no
expectation of privacy. For example, the
police can use photos taken by police helicopters above one’s property of items
that are visible from the air.
The expectation of
privacy is reduced for people who are public employees. Employees who hold
safety or security sensitive jobs such as bus drivers, train conductors, law
enforcement officers or laboratory workers, have reduced
expectations of privacy. Because of the trust society is putting in these
individuals, that compelling state interest overrides the individual’s
expectation of privacy. These people
may, for example, be subjected to drug testing that the government could not
subject an ordinary person to. [8]
Moreover, when people
voluntarily enter space in which the government has an elevated security
interest, the expectation of privacy is likewise reduced. The most obvious
example occurs at airports. Transportation Security Administration agents may
subject airline passengers and their luggage to virtually unlimited searching
with virtually no cause, which would never be allowed in most other contexts.
Rules relating to the doctrine of expectation of privacy do not operate within a vacuum. Reasonable expectations of reasonable people, factors including location, nature of the objects or data and many other factors must be considered. As such, whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists is a matter that is determined on a case by case basis, and is fact-specific.
[1] U.S.
Const. amend. IV
[2] Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347,
88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)
[3] 68
Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures
§9
[4] 15B Am.Jur.2d
Computers and the Internet §28
[5] Illinois
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
[6] Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978).
[7] Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d373 (1998)
[8] Skinner v Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed. 685 (1989), National Treasury Employees Union
v Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed. 639 (1989), National
Treasury Employees Union v Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
National Federation of Federal Employees v Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989)