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Fourth Amendment-Warrant Requirement
Exceptions (Part I)
The Founding Fathers wrote the
Fourth Amendment after their experiences with British officials who would use
general warrants and writs of assistance to enter private homes and conduct
searches to find evidence of any crime.[1] The Fourth Amendment outlaws
this practice and requires that search or arrest warrants particularly describe
the places to be searched or things being seized, and requires that they be
issued by neutral and detached magistrates.[2]
The United States Supreme Court has
asserted that “the most basic
constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Still, there are exceptions to
the idea that warrantless searches are always unreasonable. These exceptions
are “jealously and carefully drawn”
so that police must always seek a warrant, unless an exception applies.[3]
In these presentations, we’ll look
at the six major exceptions to the warrant requirement to better understand
their scopes. The first three exceptions, covered in this presentation, are
search incident to a lawful arrest, consent and plain view.
Search
Incident to Lawful Arrest
Police do not have to have a warrant
to conduct a search incident to lawful arrest. When conducting a lawful arrest,
police may search the person, any area surrounding her, and any area within her
wingspan.[4] Courts permit such a
warrantless search as a protective measure for police safety and to secure
evidence that might be destroyed.[5] Although it’s primarily
meant to secure police from the threat of weapons being accessible to the
person being arrested, the police may search and seize any contraband they find
during such a search.
This exception was developed by the
United States Supreme Court’s 1969 decision, California v. Chimel.[6] In that case, police
conducted a one-hour search of the defendant’s home after he was arrested for
alleged involvement in a coin store burglary.[7] The search revealed coins,
medals and other items that led to his conviction for burglary. While the Court
invalidated the search as excessive and unreasonable, it established that
police may search the area within immediate reach of a person being
arrested. Justice Potter Stewart wrote “When
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's
safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition,
it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction…”[8]
Since Chimel, several cases have analyzed the scope of this exception. In
the 2009 cases, Arizona v. Gant, the
Court concluded that police may search the vehicle from which a person is being
arrested if police reasonably believe that the occupant could access the
vehicle at the time of the search, or that the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense that led to the arrest.[9] On the other hand, the
exception doesn’t apply to searches of a defendant’s cellphone after his
arrest. In Riley v. United States,
San Diego police found David Riley in possession of firearms during a search
after arresting him for driving on a suspended license.[10] Police accessed Riley’s
cellphone, which was in his pocket, to examine photographs and videos, and saw
photographic evidence of gang affiliations. Riley’s attorneys sought
suppression of the evidence, arguing that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights and the Court agreed, prohibiting warrantless cell phone
searches in all but exigent circumstances. None of the two justifications for
the exception articulated in Chimel,
officer safety and destruction of evidence, would justify police searching a
cellphone without a warrant.[11]
Consent
The second exception to the warrant
requirement is consent. Consent, by definition, waives the Fourth Amendment
right against warrantless searches.[12] The consent exception is
important and practical in application. One study completed in the last ten
years found that 90% of warrantless searches are based on consent.[13] To be valid, consent must
be “freely and voluntarily.” However, it’s important to note that police need
not inform people of their right to refuse searches. So, for example, at a
traffic stop, a police officer may ask for consent to search the vehicle. If
the driver agrees, the consent is valid even if the driver had no idea that he
had the right to refuse.
The government carries the burden of
proving that a defendant freely and voluntarily provided consent.[14] In the 1973 case Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court
explained voluntary consent.[15] There, police stopped an
automobile and asked the vehicle occupants if they could search the automobile.
The defendant replied, “Sure, go ahead,” and during the subsequent police
search, police found three checks that had previously been stolen from a car
wash. The Court found that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Both
defendants and the police testified that the interactions between the two
parties were congenial and there were no discussions of crime. One of the
defendants even attempted to aid in the search. For consent to be nullified, the
facts must demonstrate that police used duress or coercion to obtain consent.[16]
A wrinkle to the consent exception
is that police can obtain consent from a person other than the person who owns
the property that is being searched. A third party who law enforcement
reasonably believes has authority to give such consent can allow police to
search another’s property, as in the case of a babysitter who allows police to
search the house.[17] If police reasonably
believed that the babysitter was the homeowner, her consent is valid. Determining
whether an officer’s belief that a third party may consent on behalf of another
is reasonable is a fact-specific evaluation.[18]
Plain
View
Law enforcement officers do not need
warrants to seize evidence of criminal activity in plain view if they
are legitimately in the locations from which the evidence can be viewed. The
Supreme Court explained that a person “generally
goes not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband left in the
open which is viewed by an officer from a lawful vantage point.”[19]
In the seminal case, Horton v. California, the defendant and
an accomplice were suspected of having used a machine gun and a “stun gun” to
steal cash and jewelry. The search warrant only allowed police to search for
the stolen property and did not include authorization to search for the
weapons.[20]
When police executed the warrant, they didn’t find any stolen property, but did
find guns in plain view.[21] The search was
permissible.
Three requirements must exist for the
exception to apply. First, police must be in the area legally. Second, police
must observe the item of criminality in plain view. Finally, the incriminating
nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent, meaning that there needs
to be a connection between the viewed object and illegal conduct.[22]
The plain view exception also applies to
allow police to seize contraband that is visible from public places, such as
drug paraphernalia visible from the street through an open window.
In the following presentation, we will discuss the three more exceptions to the warrant requirement: stop and frisk, the automobile exception and exigent circumstances.
[1] Nelson B. Lasson, The History and
Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 79-105
(1937).
[2] U.S. Const. amend. IV.
[3] Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
(1958).
[4] United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, (1973).
[5] Barbara Salken, “The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses,” 18 Pace
L. Rev. 97, (1997).
[6] Wayne Logan, “An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority To Search Incident to
Arrest,” 19 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 381, (2001).
[7] Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, (1969).
[8] Id.
[9] Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, (2009).
[10] Riley
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, (2009).
[11] Leslie Shobotham, “The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident Consequences of Making an Easy
Case Simple,” 75 La. L. Rev. 29, (2014).
[13] Ric Simmons, “Not ‘Voluntary’ but Still
Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine,” 80
Ind. L.J. 773, (2005).
[14] Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
(1968).
[15] Id.
[16] Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
(1973).
[17] Ill.
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, (1990).
[19] Minnesota
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, (1993).
[20] Loren Newman, “Horton v. California: Searching for a Good Cause,” 46 U. Miami L.
Rev. 455, (1991).
[21] Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, (1990).
[22] Id.