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Patent Rights
on Treatments During a Pandemic
With the deadly
Covid pandemic ongoing in much of the world and the limited resources available
to fight it, some in the public health community have raised the idea that governments
should suspend intellectual property protections for critically needed medical
technology to treat and stop the spread of the virus. In fact, on May 5, United
States President Joe Biden came out in favor of waiving intellectual property
protections for coronavirus vaccines due to concerns about vaccine access in
developing nations.[1]
The removal of patent protection for Covid-related medical technologies would
allow for manufacture of these technologies by third-parties. It would be part
of a global effort to increase the supply and affordability of vaccines and
therapeutics, especially for export to low-income countries.[2]
The pros of
removing patent protection, of course, is that it would free up other companies
to manufacture the vaccines faster than cheaper than just relying on companies
like Pfizer and Moderna to do so. On the other hand, removing protection
disincentivizes those companies from innovating in this area. For example, if a
new Covid variant emerges that required development of booster shots, will Pfizer
and Moderna be willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to develop them
if they think they will not be able to control their production afterwards?
Moreover, the government could theoretically buy the rights to the patent or
buy larger quantities of the vaccine itself from these companies. Is instead
simply stripping them of the intellectual property rights by statute an unfair
taking of property? These are some of the complex ethical questions that go
into the analysis. So, let’s look also at the legal landscape of this issue.
Intellectual
property protection is grounded in the US constitution, which authorizes
Congress to secure exclusive copyrights and patents to the inventor or
creator, and Congress has enacted comprehensive legislation to achieve
this goal.[3]
In addition, the United States is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, an international agreement which
requires member nations to protect patent rights. TRIPS requires countries to
prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling or
importing a patented product or process without consent of the patent’s owner.[4]
However, both
US law and TRIPS provide exceptions, in which the government may use or
authorize a third party to use a patented product without consent of the patent
owner under special circumstances. This is known as compulsory licensing.
Compulsory
licensing may be authorized when a member nation faces a national emergency or extreme
urgency. It is up to each nation to determine the circumstances under which
compulsory licenses may be granted.[5] While
the United States has not enacted a general compulsory licensing scheme as part
of patent law, forms of compulsory licensing are envisioned under some
statutes.
For example, in
1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which provided for ‘March-in’ rights
to be exercised by the federal government. This permits the government to
compel the license of a patent if that patent was developed with the help of
federal funding. The conditions under which the government may “march-in” to
license a patent to a third party are met when the action is necessary “to
alleviate health or safety needs” or “to meet requirements for public use.”[6]
As a number of
drug companies received substantial federal funding from the federal government
to develop vaccines and other Covid therapies (under programs such as
“Operation Warp Speed”), attention has focused on whether the government should
invoke these march-in rights to license patented technology resulting from this
funding.[7]
Doing so would
be unprecedented, as no federal agency has ever invoked march-in rights in the
past. The National Institute of Health, for example, refused to exercise these
rights against pharmaceutical companies developing HIV/AIDS medications it
helped to fund, despite being petitioned by public interest groups, who cited
high drug prices as a barrier to public health.[8]
Even were the
government to pursue this route, the law requires a lengthy agency
decision-making process, followed in all likelihood by litigation. The
time-frame involved in the march-in process makes it a poor option for the
near-term goals of combating the spread of the Coronavirus.
Another avenue
open to the government does not involve compulsory licensing per-se, but rather
relies on a provision of the US Code concerning government use or manufacture
of a patented invention. Under the law, when the US government authorizes a
third-party to manufacture a patented product on behalf of the Government,
that third-party is protected from liability even if neither the third-party
nor the Government received consent from the patent owner. Instead, the remedy
for patent infringement is only available against the government itself, in the
Court of Federal Claims. Moreover, remedies in such cases are limited to
“reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture” of patented
items, and companies do not have the ability to stop the use or manufacture of
their patented products.[9]
Unlike march-in
rights, there is precedent for the government using this provision. In the
1950s, the Department of Defense relied on these protections when it purchased
antibiotics from a company that did not own their patents. More recently, the
threat of invoking this law allowed the government to successfully pressure the
makers of Cipro to lower their prices during the 2001 anthrax scare.[10]
A similar
discussion is underway in countries around the world. Unlike the United States,
many European countries, as well as India and Canada, have domestic legislation
which specifically provides for compulsory licensing to encourage public access
to pharmaceutical products. Utilizing such laws is seen as a way to boost
production, and thereby ensure affordable access to lifesaving medical
interventions and vaccines during the pandemic, especially for poor and developing
countries. India and South Africa have proposed that the World Trade
Organization exempt TRIPS-member countries from enforcing patents and trade
secrets to allow other drug companies to produce cheaper generics without fear
of being sued for patent infringement.
Some have
argued that suspension of patent rights alone may not suffice to enable
production by third parties, since company trade secrets and other non-public
information may be needed to effectively manufacture products such as vaccines,
and there is little clear legal authority to force companies to turn over such
information.[11]
Likewise, there has been pushback on the grounds that complex therapeutics and
vaccines require sophisticated production facilities, and that it is the lack
of such infrastructure as well as access to needed raw materials- rather than
intellectual property rights- which is holding back the supply.[12]
In light of
these logistical concerns, governments and pharmaceutical companies have also
looked to alternate approaches to increase the supply of vaccines and
therapeutics where they are needed without limiting patent protections. Some of
the major pharmaceutical companies have agreed to selectively license their
technologies without profit, to reserve a fixed quantity of vaccine doses for
low-income countries, and to participate in the WHO’s COVAX program, the
cooperative international effort to distribute vaccine doses around the world.[13]
So, while
mechanisms exist to get around patent protections as a barrier to making Covid
vaccines and therapeutics available around the world, these mechanisms may be
insufficient and it’s unclear whether the political will exists to use them.
Either way, more direct measured may be necessary to help fight Covid in less
developed countries.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/05/us/politics/biden-covid-vaccine-patents.html
[2] Hillary Wong,
“The case for compulsory licensing during COVID-19” http://www.jogh.org/documents/issue202001/jogh-10-010358.pdf
[3] U.S. Const.art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2).
[4] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 28:1
[5] Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (November 14, 2001).
[6] 35 U.S.C.A. § 301.
[7] “Want Vaccines Fast?
Suspend Intellectual Property Rights” (December 7, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/opinion/covid-vaccines-patents.html; “March-In Rights And
Compulsory Licensing—Safety Nets For Access To A COVID-19 Vaccine” (May 6, 2020)
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200501.798711/full/.
[8]
“COVID-19 Update: Patent Rights in the COVID-19 Pandemic: How will Industries
and Governments Respond?”
(Friday, March 27, 2020)
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/covid-19-update-patent-rights-covid-19-pandemic-how-will-industries-and-governments
[9] 28 U.S.C. §1498.
[10] “March-In RightsAnd Compulsory Licensing—Safety Nets For Access To A COVID-19 Vaccine” (May 6,
2020).
[11] “Should IP
Rights Be Suspended for COVID Vaccines? A Q&A With University of Houston's
Sapna Kumar” (April 28, 2021)
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/04/28/should-ip-rights-be-suspended-for-covid-vaccines-a-qa-with-university-of-houstons-sapna-kumar/.
[12] “Why intellectual property rights matter for COVID-19”
(January 19, 2021)
https://geneva-network.com/research/why-intellectual-property-rights-matter-for-covid-19/.
[13] Michael Rosenblatt, “The downside of
suspending intellectual property rights on COVID-19 vaccines” (April 23, 2021). https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/04/23/opinion/downside-suspending-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines/.