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President Trump’s Pardon of Joe Arpaio: Can it be Invalidated?
For 24 years, Sheriff Joe Arpaio was known
as “America’s Toughest Sheriff,” but he ran into legal trouble in the past few
years. In May 2013, United States District Court Judge Murray Snow found that then-Maricopa
County Sheriff Arpaio and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office had engaged in
racial profiling[1]
and harassment of members of the Spanish-speaking community in Maricopa County,
Arizona.[2] To remedy these
violations, Judge Snow issued an injunction, ordering the department to cease
using race or ancestry as a basis for traffic stops.
More than three years later, the
Department of Justice filed a criminal contempt case against Arpaio, alleging
that he had violated the injunction.[3] In July 2017, United
States District Judge Susan Bolton found Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt of
court for having willfully defied Judge Snow’s injunction by continuing to
target Latinos for traffic stops for at least 17 months after the injunction
was issued. With his sentencing scheduled for early October, the former sheriff
faced the possibility of spending up to six months in jail for these
violations.
Late on the evening of August 25, President Trump pardoned Arpaio. Judge Bolton issued an order on August 29, vacating the sentencing date, but scheduled a briefing and arguments for October 4 to determine whether to vacate his conviction. A month after the pardon, the United States’ legal community has become entangled in a debate on the constitutionality of President Trump’s pardon.
President’s Pardoning Power
Article 2, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the President “shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”[4] Presidents have traditionally granted pardons in two situations: near the end of each year as a show of goodwill and forgiveness[5] and in the final days of an administration, when the President no longer needs political capital and loses little by such pardoning.[6]
Legal Issues Involved in President Trump’s Pardon of Joe Arpaio
Professor Josh Dressler at the Moritz
College of Law at Ohio State University expressed concern over the pardon,
saying, “There is something especially disturbing here when the crime the
person is receiving a pardon for is criminal contempt of the court.”[7]
Groups such as the “Protect Democracy
Project” and the Macarthur Justice Center, as well as nationally-renowneded law
professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Michael Tigar, have submitted briefs in
anticipation of the October 4 hearing, arguing that the pardon is invalid.
These briefs provide several arguments that President Trump’s pardon violates
the Constitution.[8]
We will discuss three of the strongest such arguments.
The first argument rests on the Fifth
Amendment’s “due process” clause, which requires that no person “shall be…deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” The argument suggests that the
pardon violates the due process rights of the people who were unfairly targeted
by Arpaio and his office due to racial profiling. In its brief, the Protect
Democracy Project writes that the pardon violates due process because it
“forgives” Arpaio for taking actions that limited the protection of people’s
rights. Such an action makes the due process guaranteed by law “an empty
promise.”[9]
The second argument relates to the
President’s constitutional authority under the pardon clause. Critics point to the
text, which provides that the President can only pardon “for Offenses against the United States.” The argument here is that a
criminal-contempt conviction isn’t the same as an “offense against the United
States” because contempt is not treated as a classical “crime” under the United
States Code.
The third argument is based on separation
of powers. In his brief, Professor Chemirinsky writes that federal courts, as
the judicial branch, have developed the contempt of court charge to redress disobedience
of a court’s orders. As such, a contempt of court charge is unique to the
judicial branch, not a penal law developed by the legislature. By pardoning
Arpaio, critics argue that President Trump and the executive branch are undermining
the judicial branch’s ability to protect its own processes.[10] In an interview,
Chemerinsky admitted that his argument is unsupported by legal precedent, but he
argues that the legal precedent on the subject is “wrong.”[11]
Against these arguments, President Trump
and Sheriff Joe supporters emphasize that through more than 200 years of
jurisprudence, the president’s pardon power has always been viewed as extensive
and that presidents have always been free to use it as they see fit.[12] In Ex Parte Garland, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court Stephen Johnson Field even wrote that except in cases of impeachment,
“the power is unlimited.”[13]
Arpaio Supporters also find backing in
the only Supreme Court case in our nation’s history that dealt with a presidential
pardon of a criminal contempt of court offense. In that 1925 case, Ex Parte Grossman, Philip Grossman was
ordered to stop selling liquor during prohibition. He ignored the order and was
sentenced to one year in prison for violating the National Prohibition Act.
Soon afterwards, President Calvin Coolidge pardoned Grossman, reducing his
sentence to the payment of a fine. The Court held unanimously that the
President did have the power to pardon Grossman for a criminal contempt of
court.[14] Chief Justice William Howard
Taft (who, incidentally, is still the only person ever to serve as President
and Justice of the Supreme Court), did caution, “Our Constitution confers this
discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not
abuse it.”[15]
Still, the result of the case and its decision placed no limitations on the
pardon power. In fact, all the arguments against the pardon’s validity rely on
theories unsupported by precedent.
The saga of Sheriff Joe continues to
unfold, as Judge Bolton recently ordered Department of Justice to provide the
legal grounds for having the criminal-contempt conviction dismissed.[16] President Trump’s first
use of his pardon power has drawn both praise and criticism and may lead to
more debate and clarification of the Presidential pardon power.
[2] Vasanthi Venkatesh, “Mobilizing Under
‘Illegality’: The Arizona Immigrant Rights Movement’s Engagement With the Law,”
19 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 165, (2016).
[4] U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
[5] Jack Beermann, “Presidential Power in
Transitions,” 83 B.U.L. Rev. 947, (2003).
[6]
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/us/politics/trump-pardon-joe-arpaio-constitution.html?mcubz=1
[11]
https://www.thenation.com/article/erwin-chemerinsky-trumps-terrible-pardon-of-sherriff-joe-arpaio/
[12] Id.
[13] Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, (1867).
[14] Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, (1925).
[15] Id.