Suing for a Civil Rights Violation - Module 5 of 5
Module V- Suing for a Civil Rights Violation
Protests rocked the
college town of Charlottesville, Virginia in August, 2017. The city found
itself thrust uncomfortably into the national spotlight as a white nationalist
rally and a counter protest took place in a Charlottesville city park,
Emancipation Park.
White nationalists had
long planned a demonstration, called “Unite the Right”, over the city’s
decision to remove a statue of Robert E. Lee.[1]
As the date of the planned rally approached, the City revoked a permit for the
rally to take place. In its place, the City offered rally organizers a permit
that would have allowed the planned protest at another park.
Jason Kessler, the
white nationalist rally organizer, sued the City over its revocation of the
Emancipation Park permit under Title 42 of the United States Code, Section
1983. The day before the scheduled rally, a federal judge issued an order
prohibiting the City from revoking the original permit, and the protest went
ahead as scheduled.[2] During
the protest, at least 34 people were injured, and one lost her life.[3]
When a state deprives a
person of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or by federal law, or threatens
to do so, Section 1983 provides the ability to sue for damages, an injunction
and other relief.[4] In
this module, we will examine how Section 1983 actions are made, the elements a
plaintiff must establish and the potential remedies a court may award. We’ll
also learn about the federal “counterpart” to Section 1983 claims, Bivens
actions, and finally, we’ll discuss the role of state law on the vindication of
civil rights.
Section 1983 Actions
Section 1983 provides that
any person who “under color of” state law subjects any person “to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”[5]
Professor Myriam E.
Gilles refers to Section 1983 as a law “intended to combat the widespread
practices of local officials”[6]
and the Supreme Court has described it as a law that should prevent “abuses of power by those acting under color
of state law.”[7]
Very little Section
1983 litigation occurred until the 1961 Supreme Court decision, Monroe v.
Pape.[8]
There, 13 Chicago police officers broke into the petitioner’s home without a
warrant and made him and his family stand naked in the living room while they
ransacked every other room. Soon after, Monroe was taken to the police station
where he wasn’t permitted to call his family or attorney until he was eventually
released without charges.[9]
He sued the officers,
alleging a warrantless search that violated his constitutional rights. The
Court held that Monroe’s lawsuit against the Chicago police detectives and
other state officers could move forward so long as they were acting under color
of law when they violated his constitutional rights, even though no state law
authorized the officers’ actions.
Section 1983 is not
itself a source of substantive rights.[10]
It provides a person with a method for vindicating existing constitutional or federal
rights, such as the rights to free speech, to be free from a warrantless search
or to bear arms. Section 1983 creates a vehicle for enforcing these existing
rights.[11]
State and local government officials who deprive people of constitutional
rights may be held personally liable under Section 1983 for damages caused by
their illegal conduct.[12]
Elements of a Civil Rights Action
A Section 1983 lawsuit
consists of two elements that a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence. First, he must prove a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.[13]
Let’s return to our example involving Kessler and the city of Charlottesville. Kessler
argued that the city’s revocation of the permit to protest violated his
constitutional rights to freedom of speech, of assembly and petition guaranteed
to him under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
While there are
thousands of federal laws, and while many of those laws impose obligations or
duties on state governments, not every federal statute creates a “right” that
can be vindicated via a Section 1983 claim. For a federal statute to be
enforceable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a right,
not merely a violation of federal law. How can someone know whether she has
been deprived of a “right” “created” by a federal statute?
The Supreme Court has established
a three-factor test when considering whether a federal statute grants a
claimant an enforceable right.[14]
First, when examining the text of the statute, it must be clear that Congress
intended that the provision in question benefit the claimant. Second, the
claimant must show that the right protected by the statute is not so “vague and
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Finally, the
statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the states.
Another necessary
element for a 1983 action is that the violation must have been committed by a
person acting under the color of state law.[15]
The Supreme Court has found that “state
employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor.”[16]
Thus, if a state employee was acting in his employment capacity, the person is
acting under the color of state law.
However, even private
people can be said to be acting “under color” of state law, which is a fact-specific
determination and depend on the ties between the person and the action to state
law and officials.[17]
Factors relevant to determining whether a private person’s actions are under
color of state law include whether the government accepted benefits from the unconstitutional
behavior, whether the party acted with the help of state officials and whether
the state or state officials provided encouragement for the party to act.
In Benn v. Universal
Health System, the plaintiff was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric
facility in Pennsylvania for an emergency examination after exhibiting suicidal
thoughts. Upon arrival at the facility, he was put into an isolated waiting
room. After his release, Benn brought federal and state claims against the
doctors involved in his commitment, asserting claims under Section 1983 for
alleged violations of his due process rights.[18]
The court dismissed the
lawsuit, finding that the psychiatrists did not act under the color of state
law. The court found that, though the psychiatrists were licensed by
Pennsylvania, they did not operate as "willful participants” in joint
activity with Pennsylvania or its agents. Second, the psychiatrists were
employed by a private mental health facility and weren’t controlled by an agency
of the state. Finally, there was no “entwinement” between what the psychiatrists
did and the state. Instead, they were private actors who’s only association
with the state was that Pennsylvania licensed them. As such, Benn’s Section
1983 claim couldn’t move forward.[19]
Section 1983 Remedies
There are several
remedies available to an aggrieved party who prevails on a Section 1983 claim. First,
he can be awarded damages, including compensatory damages such as actual losses
and out-of-pocket costs sustained.[20]
However, the Supreme Court has held that no compensatory damages can be awarded
for violation of a constitutional right “absent proof of actual injury.”[21]
Second, a plaintiff can
seek injunctive relief to stop the state actor’s activities if he can
demonstrate irreparable injury that isn’t merely speculative.[22]
An injunction is an “extraordinary remed[y] involving the exercise of very far-reaching
power” and is “granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.”[23]
Injunctive relief is the remedy the court awarded to Kessler after he filed a
Section 1983 claim disputing the revocation of his protest permit. The court
enjoined the city of Charlottesville from revoking the white nationalist
group’s permit to protest at the city park.
Bivens Actions
Section 1983 creates a
cause of action that a claimant may bring against a person acting under color
of state law. When a federal official inflicts a
loss of federal rights on a claimant, Section 1983 does not provide the
claimant an avenue for vindicating the loss of rights.
Instead, the federal
counterpart of a civil rights action brought under Section 1983 is known as a Bivens action,[24]
named after the lawsuit Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.[25]
There, the Supreme Court found it inherently unfair that someone whose
constitutional rights were violated could be deprived of redress simply by
virtue of the fact that the wrongdoer was a federal rather than state official.[26]
To prevail on a Bivens
claim, a claimant must prove two elements. First, the claimant must prove that she
had a constitutionally-protected right at stake. Second, she must prove that a
federal official or someone acting on behalf of the federal government violated
that right.
Bivens actions, however, are subject to the potential defense of
sovereign immunity, a principal that sovereign nations cannot be sued without
their consent.[27]
There are two types of immunity: absolute and qualified. Absolute
immunity is granted to judges, prosecutors, legislators, and many members of
the executive branch who act within the scope of their duties. For example,
individual Congressmen cannot be sued personally for passing “bad” laws. By the
same token, people cannot sue the President personally for failing to enforce
federal law through the Department of Justice.
Qualified immunity
applies to federal officials and protects them from liability for civil rights
violations committed during the exercise of their discretionary duties.[28]
Discretionary duties are those where the federal official is exercising his own
judgment in the performance of his duties. Qualified immunity generally
protects people if they acted in good faith even if the result of the action
was to deny someone of her rights.
The Supreme Court has limited the availability of Bivens actions to a narrow
range of cases. It
has found that they’re not appropriate if there are reasons to disallow such
suits, especially in the absence of clear intent by Congress to establish a
federal remedy. Bivens actions are
also unavailable where Congress has provided an alternative remedy as a
substitute for recovery and the other remedy is effective to protect the rights
at issue.[29]
State Law and Civil Rights
Many states have also
addressed discrimination and civil rights, often extending the protections
further than does federal law. California, for example, has established a
vigorous state law framework for the vindication of state law-based civil
rights.
The California Unruh
Civil Rights Act provides:[30]
“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual
orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever.”
The law applies to all
businesses such as hotels, restaurants, hospitals, and retail establishments.
Some states that have not
adopted laws like California’s provide alternative approaches to vindicating
civil rights. One common method used by state courts is to refer to the
provisions of state constitutions to vindicate rights that have not yet been
recognized by federal courts or to recognize rights that federal courts have
refused to recognize.
The late Supreme Court
Justice, William Brennan, published his view on the important role of state
courts and state constitutions in securing individual liberties. He wrote:[31]
“State courts cannot rest when they have
afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretations of
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore
must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state
law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.”
Justice Brennan’s view
found support among judges of state appellate and supreme courts. In one case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court explained, “The states may, as the United States
Supreme Court has often recognized, afford their citizens greater protection
than the safeguards guaranteed in the Federal Constitution. Indeed, the states
are 'independently’ responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.”[32]
The quest by same sex
couples for marriage equality illustrates this role of state courts and state
constitutions. In Bowers v.
Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that a Georgia state law
criminalizing sodomy did not violate any fundamental right under the
Constitution.[33] It
was 17 years before the Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that a Texas
statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.[34]
It was another 12 years until the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional
right to same-sex marriages.[35]
In that interim,
equality advocates pursued relief in state courts, seeking state court
interpretations of these rights under state constitutions, thus eliminating the
risk of federal court interference. While these efforts were met with mixed
results, they resulted in same-sex marriage being recognized in 37 states
before the Obergefell decision
crystalized it nationwide.[36]
In another example,
abortion advocates have sought to vindicate the right to abortion under state
constitutional laws. In Iowa, for example, a 2018 state Supreme Court decision
invalidated mandatory 72-hour waiting periods for abortion under a state law.[37]
It is improbable that this waiting period would have been invalidated under the
federal Constitution.[38]
These cases, along with many criminal
procedural rights cases, are being argued and decided under reinvigorated state
constitutions and securing rights under state constitutions in a manner that
eludes the possibility of reversal by federal courts.
This concludes our program on civil
rights law. Constitutional guarantees and laws enacted in the last half century
have had a profound impact on our society and the progress made towards
limiting discrimination. Thank you for your participation and we encourage you
to take advantage of our other course offerings.
[1] Sheryl G. Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, “Man Charged After White Nationalist Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence,” N.Y. Times, (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-protest-white-nationalist.html.
[2] Opinion, Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No. 3:17CV00056, (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.vawd.uscourts.gov/OPINIONS/CONRAD/kesslercitycharlottesvilleopor.pdf.
[3] Sheryl G. Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, “Man Charged After White Nationalist Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence,” N.Y. Times, (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-protest-white-nationalist.html.
[4] Edward S. Harmening & Craig M. Sandberg, “Litigating Damages and Attorney Fees in Section 1983 Litigation: Capitalizing on the Law,” American Bar Association (Spring 2006), https://www.sandberglaw.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2014/01/sandberg-spring2006.pdf.
[6] Myriam E. Gilles, “Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" inSection 1983 Municipal Liability,” 80 B.U. L. Rev. 17, 20 (2000).
[8] Brad Reid, “A Legal Overview of Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation,” Huffington Post, (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-legal-overview-of-section-1983-civil-rights-litigation_us_58f0e17ee4b048372700d793.
[11] Robert P. Capistrano, “5.1.A Express Causes of Action, Section 1983, Elements of the Claim,” Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys, http://federalpracticemanual.org/chapter5/section1a (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
[12] Gary S. Gildin, “The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 And Bivens Actions: ThePrima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution,” 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 557, 561 (1983).
[13] Id. at 560.
[19] Id. at 171-73.
[22] Kent Brintall, “Section 1983 Outline,” U.S. Ct. App. for the Ninth Cir., (2002), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/guides/Section_1983_Outline_2012.pdf.
[24] “Bivens Actions,” EricJohnson.com,http://www.eejlaw.com/courses/torts_1011/Torts_one-sheet_Bivens_actions.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
[26] Id. at 389; Perry M. Rosen, “The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise,” 67 N.C.L. Rev. 337, 338 (1989).
[27] Edward Richards, “Constitutional Torts – Bivens Actions,” LSU Law Center, https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/ConstitutionalTorts-BivensActions.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
[28] John D. Kirby, “Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Standard,” 85 Cornell L. Rev. 461, 469 (2000).
[29] “Bivens Actions -- United States Supreme Court Cases,” 22 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 159.
[30] Cal. Civ. Code § 51-52.
[31] William J. Brennan, Jr., “State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights,” 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977).
[36] “State Same-Sex Marriage State Laws Map,” Governing,http://www.governing.com/gov-data/same-sex-marriage-civil-unions-doma-laws-by-state.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
[37] Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds, et. al., No. 17-1579 at *67 (Iowa June 29, 2018).