Judicial Review of Administration Actions - Module 5 of 5
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Module 5: Judicial Review of Administration Actions
Unless specifically precluded
by law, the actions of federal agencies are subject to judicial review by the
federal courts. [1]
For purposes of judicial review, “agency action” covers a range of agency
functions, including issuing rules and orders and granting licenses, sanctions
or relief. Likewise, the denial of a request for any of these and an agency’s
failure to act are considered agency actions subject to judicial review.[2] A failure to act means a
failure to engage in one of the recognized functions which fall under the
definition of agency action.[3]
Scope of Judicial Review
The Administrative Procedures
Act recognizes two primary categories of exceptions to the general
reviewability of agency actions. First, Congress may preclude review of
specific agency decisions by statute.[4] However, since judicial
review plays a critical role in limiting and overseeing the power of agencies,
the courts have held that agency actions are reviewable unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that Congress intended to preclude such review in
the statute.[5]
The APA also recognizes an
alternative narrow exception to the applicability of judicial review, when
“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”[6] This has been interpreted to
mean that the courts may not review agency decisions when the law provides no
meaningful standards for a court to review an agency decision for abuse of
discretion. Examples of agency actions recognized to be unreviewable under this
narrow qualification are decisions concerning whether to prosecute someone and
whether the CIA may discharge an employee without stating a cause.[7]
When a federal court reviews
the actions of an administrative agency, it does not simply take the place of
the agency and re-decide the matter from scratch. Instead, courts employ standards
of review, which determine the extent to which the court will defer
to the findings of the agencies and the basis on which they may overturn
agency decisions.
For purposes of judicial
review, courts distinguish between the standard of review applicable to agency
determination of facts, and the standard applicable for an agency’s
interpretation of the law. When it comes to the determination of facts,
a court reviewing agency action will ask only whether the agency finding was
supported by substantial evidence.[8] This standard has been understood to mean that
the court must accept the agency’s findings with regard to facts as long as the
evidence for the findings is such that a “reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”[9]
To make this determination,
the court will examine the evidence from both sides of the case, and not simply
make a judgment as to the reasonableness of agency actions based on the
evidence that supports such actions.[10] If the court finds that the
substantial evidence test has been met, the court will accept the findings of
fact as determined by the agency, even if the court itself may consider an
alternative finding of fact to be more reasonable.
Note that findings of fact
include inferences made by an agency based on factual findings. This
means that a court will defer to the agency’s inferences of fact, such as the
determination of motives, as long as such inferences are reasonable.[11] In this way, unless the
agency action is deemed unreasonable, the courts will defer to agencies, and
specifically to agency policy-makers and adjudicators, who often have developed
an expertise in the areas over which they preside. Deferring to the agency also
promotes uniform standards on the part of the agency, rather than the court
substituting its own judgement for those cases under review.
When allowed judicial review,
courts are empowered to provide various remedies for improper agency actions. Some
statutes specify the remedies which a court may grant if the court determines
that agency actions are inappropriate or unlawful. In the absence of such
statutory remedies, the APA provides for any applicable form of legal action as
remedies available under judicial review.[12]
Generally, petitioners ask
courts to issue declaratory judgments establishing that the agency
action was unlawful and/or seek injunctions to prevent actions from
moving forward. Another remedy, though one not commonly used, is a writ of
mandamus. A court will order a writ of mandamus to compel a federal
officer, up to and including the head of an agency, to perform a duty owed to
the petitioner before the court. The writ may be issued, on the discretion of
the court, when the plaintiff has a clear and indisputable right to relief, and
when doing so can correct an abuse of discretion by the agency.[13] Finally, when the government
restricts the freedom of an individual, he can seek a writ of habeas corpus
to secure release from detention.[14]
Review of Interpretations of Law
Agency adjudication and
rulemaking also require determinations on the part of the agency as to the
meaning and scope of legal authority. This is true when the agency makes a
binding legal decision and when agencies adopt substantive and interpretive
rules. Such determinations of law are reviewable by courts as part of the power
of judicial review.
Traditionally, courts had wide
leeway in reviewing agency understandings and interpretations of the law. The
courts could effectively substitute their own judgements for those of the
agency, giving little or no deference to the agency’s own legal interpretation.[15] However, in a landmark case,
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court held
that when Congress delegates to administrative agencies the power to interpret
laws, then the courts must accept agency interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. The agency’s interpretation must only be reasonable for it to be
upheld. This respect that courts must give agency determinations has become
known as Chevron deference, after the name of the case.[16]
In the Chevron case, a
federal court reviewed an EPA rule that defined an ambiguous term in
environmental legislation passed by Congress. A lower court held that, while
the term was not clearly defined in the statute, the agency’s interpretation of
the term was inappropriate in light of the statute’s overall purpose. The
Supreme Court, however, overturned the lower court’s decision, ruling that when
the language of a statute is unclear, Congress implicitly delegates the right
to interpret that statute to the agency it puts in charge of enforcing that
statute.
To determine whether Chevron
deference applies, courts apply a two-step analysis. First, the court asks
whether the statute in question is clear on its face. If the language of
the law is clear, the agency is bound to follow the clear language, and
the courts need not defer to agency interpretations contrary to the clear wording
of the statute. However, if the statute is ambiguous, the court will proceed to
step two of the analysis, which is to ask whether the agency’s interpretation
of the ambiguous terms is reasonable.[17]
Reasonability is not a high
standard, and most agency legal interpretations will be upheld unless the
reasoning involved is so poor or illogical that the agency’s action is
considered arbitrary and capricious.[18] This approach has led to
much greater deference on the part of the courts to agency rulemaking.
Note that Chevron deference
only applies to official agency adjudication and rulemaking. Agencies often
issue guidance documents, frequently referred to as interpretative rules, meant
to inform the public and guide agency policy, but which are not legally
binding. These rules, even when they
involve interpretation of law, do not merit Chevron deference, as Chevron
was limited to the idea that Congress delegated lawmaking power to agencies
only when they engage in formal adjudication or substantive rulemaking.[19]
Agency Discretion
While courts will not review
agency actions where the court has no manageable standards to use as the basis
for review, courts can and do review agency actions in most cases. These
include discretionary acts of an agency regarding the implementation of policy
and how to apply the policy in individual cases. For example, whether the
agency chooses to adopt a strict or a lenient rule or how an agency chooses to
sanction someone who violates a statute is reviewable.
Still, courts may only
invalidate agency actions when they are found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion.[20] Courts have interpreted this
standard as requiring a “hard look” by the court reviewing the agency action, in
which the court engages in a substantial inquiry and a thorough, in-depth
review.”[21]
The court will ask whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgement.
For example, in one case, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration adopted a rule requiring all new
cars to have air bags or automatic seatbelts. A few years later, the agency
rescinded the rule on the grounds that automatic seatbelts could be detached
and that there was insufficient evidence to expect increased use of seatbelts
under the rule.
The Supreme Court ruled that
the decision to do away with the rule completely was arbitrary and capricious.
The Court noted that the agency did not consider several relevant factors when
deciding to rescind the existing rule. These included the continued safety
contributions of air bags and evidence before the agency that seatbelt use would
increase if the existing rule went into effect. Additionally, the Court pointed
to reasonable alternative rules the agency could have proposed instead of
striking the rule entirely, such as a rule requiring non-detachable
seatbelts. Taken together, this “hard look” revealed that the agency had not
properly considered relevant factors, so that the decision itself was held to
be arbitrary and capricious and struck down.[22]
Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign
immunity is a common law rule which precludes lawsuits against the
government unless the government waives its sovereign immunity. In the context
of administrative law, this means that federal agencies cannot be sued unless
the government consents.[23]
However, Congress has enacted
a statute which waives the government’s immunity against lawsuits for all cases
in which a plaintiff seeks non-monetary relief.[24] In addition, some tort
actions for monetary damages may be brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, which opens the government to liability for negligent or wrongful acts
of government employees acting within the scope of their employment.[25]
However, immunity remains in
place for damages caused by the exercise of discretion by a government
official fulfilling his duties.[26] So, for example, the
government was held to be immune to a lawsuit when the Federal Aviation
Administration chose to spot-check manufacturer designs for new aircrafts
rather than employing a more exacting method of oversight.[27]
Even when the government
itself may be subject to lawsuits, government officials are generally
immune from liability in their individual capacities for acts undertaken as
part of their duties. So, if a federal employee is acting within the scope of
his employment, any claims for personal injury or property damage arising from
the employee’s negligence may only be brought against the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, and not against individual federal employee.[28]
However, this immunity is only
a qualified immunity. Federal officials may be liable as
individuals for tortious acts performed outside of the scope of their
authority.[29]
Likewise, under certain conditions, individual officials may be liable for the
violation of constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from unlawful
searches and seizures.[30]
Standing
Not every case can be brought
in federal court. Under the limits imposed by the Constitution, a federal court
may only allow one with a personal stake in the outcome of the court’s decision
to have one’s claims adjudicated. This personal stake is known as standing.
This requirement of standing applies to those seeking judicial review of
the decisions of administrative agencies.
Courts use a three-part test
to determine whether a petitioner before the court has standing to press a case
in federal court.[31]
First, the plaintiff must have
suffered or will suffer an injury-in-fact. This means that injury is both
concrete and particular and also actual or imminent. As such, courts may
dismiss petitioners’ claims for lack of standing if the injury alleged is too
abstract or is generalized to a broad population of people. Alternatively, if
the injury has not yet occurred, the court may find that the threat of injury
is too speculative to merit standing.
For example, the Supreme Court
denied standing to an environmentalist group who sought to protect endangered
species in a foreign country on the grounds that the harm they alleged was too
speculative and not imminent. In particular, the Court rejected the group’s
contention that unspecific plans to return to visit the area and enjoy the
wildlife was sufficient to establish an imminent injury which gave them a
personal stake in the outcome.[32]
Under the second prong of the
test for standing, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct brought before the court. This imposes a burden on those
challenging administrative action to show that the harm suffered is “fairly
traceable” to the administrative action in question.
Finally, it must be likely,
rather than speculative, that a favorable decision by the court will redress
the injury.[33]
In addition to this
Constitutional test for standing, plaintiffs must also establish that they are
“within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question,” to seek judicial review under the Administrative
Procedures Act.[34]
Under this “zone of interest test,” the court will determine whether the
plaintiff is among the group whose interests the statute was intended to
protect. Harms to those who are incidental to the aim of the statute do not
produce standing.
In one case, court reporters
sued an agency for failing to hold on-the-record hearings as required by law.
The reporters sought to recover for damages due to the economic loss suffered
as a result of the lost work opportunity when the agency improperly failed to
hold hearings. The court opined that such injury, while real, did not pass the
zone-of-interest test, as it was clear that Congress intended for parties to
the adjudication to be protected by the hearing requirement, and not incidental
groups such as court reporters.[35]
Even if a petitioner is deemed
to have standing, the court may not hear the case if it deems that the matter
has not reached the stage of the process at which the court can take up the
case. The first question the court will
ask with regard to timing concerns the issue of ripeness. A matter is
considered ripe for a court to adjudicate when the issue underlying the
case has matured into an actual legal controversy, or when the harm alleged by
the plaintiff has actually occurred. If the court assesses that claims of legal
violation of harms are premature, the court will reject the case for lack of
ripeness.
An example of a case dismissed
for lack of ripeness involved the US Forest Service, which was sued for
adopting a resource plan which envisioned the logging of large sections of a
national forest. The court held the case was not ripe for trial because the
Forest Service had yet to specifically authorize actual logging in designated
areas, and that any such authorization would have to undergo a notice and
comment period.[36]
In administrative law, there
is also a requirement that the matter before the court for review be the final
action of the agency. This finality requirement means that a preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action is not reviewable by the courts
because these are not final agency actions. Agency actions are only
final when the action is the consummation of the agency’s decision-making
process, and the action is one from which legal consequences will flow.[37]
Conclusion
Thank you for participating in
LawShelf’s video-course on Administrative Law Structures. We hope that you now
understand the structure of administrative agencies, along with their roles in
the US government. We hope that you will take advantage of our other courses in
government and civics and we encourage you to contact us if you have any
questions or feedback.
[1] APA §701(a).
[3] Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55,124 S. Ct. 2373, 159 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2004).
[7] See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 84L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 100L. Ed. 2d 632 (1988).
[13] See In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723(D.C. Cir. 2005); Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1972).
[16] Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984); https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference
[30] Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).
[36] Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726,118 S. Ct. 1665, 140 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1998).