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The
Legality of Suing a Sitting President
On Page 9 of her decision in Zervos
v. Trump, Judge Jennifer Schecter of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York for New York County begins her analysis with the sentence, “No one is above the law.”[1] The decision has paved the
way for lawyers to seek depositions from several women who have accused
President Donald Trump of sexual harassment prior to being elected President of
the United States.
In 2005, Summer Zervos was a contestant
on the hit reality television show, The
Apprentice. At the time, Donald Trump not only produced, but also starred
in the show, which pitted contestants’ business skills against each other. Though
he “fired” her from the show, Zervos and Trump remained in touch. Zervos
alleges that two years later, President Trump kissed her twice on the lips
without her permission and that he made other unwanted sexual advances on her.
Zervos made her allegations as Trump’s presidential
election campaign ramped up in the summer and autumn of 2016. When asked about
these allegations, Trump repeatedly accused her of being dishonest, stating in public
that Zervos told “phony stories” and that her statements were “total fiction”
and “all false stuff.”[2]
Counseled
by leading women’s rights attorney Gloria Allred, Zervos filed a defamation lawsuit
in New York state court, alleging that Trump had harmed her reputation by implying
that she was a liar.[3] She argued that she
suffered financial losses and emotional distress.[4] In mid-March 2018, Judge
Schecter denied Trump’s motion to dismiss. She cited both the statements that
Trump made while campaigning and his Twitter posts and found that that Zervos
had made a sufficient claim that Trump’s statements could constitute defamation.
As such, Zervos’s lawsuit can move forward.
In the United States’ history, four
sitting presidents have been subject to suits for private actions. Suits
against Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman were dismissed and one
involving President John F. Kennedy was settled. The fourth, Paula Jones’
lawsuit against President Bill Clinton, formed the basis of the 1997 Supreme
Court of the United States case, Clinton v. Jones. In that case, the
Supreme Court distinguished between “official” and “unofficial” conduct and ruled
that a sitting president may be sued for the latter, but not the former.
Paula Jones had alleged that in 1991,
while she was an Arkansas state employee, then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton
made numerous “abhorrent” sexual advances towards her and that her supervisors
punished her for rejecting them. Jones sued Clinton for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and defamation.
Clinton argued that any action against
him should be postponed until he left office. He argued that the powers and
responsibilities of the presidency demand devotion of undivided time and
attention to public duties and interests.[5] If a sitting President is
threatened by the risks of politically motivated lawsuits, then he’ll be
distracted and won’t be able to serve the American public to the best of his
abilities.
The Court disagreed with President
Clinton. In an opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, it recognized that
while a president must be shielded from liability for actions taken in office,
so he can “perform designated functions
effectively without fear,” that protection and immunity from civil suits in
federal court does not extend to matters unrelated to the presidency. During a
lawsuit for unofficial conduct, the high respect owed to the president’s office
“is a matter that should inform the
timing and scope of discovery,” but the Court reasoned that the separation
of powers did not prohibit the federal courts from hearing Jones’ sexual
harassment suit, reasoning that “[t]he
litigation of questions that relate entirely to the unofficial conduct of the
individual who happens to be the President poses no perceptible risk of
misallocation of either judicial power or executive power.” In November
1998, President Clinton reached an out-of-court settlement with Jones, agreeing
to pay her $850,000 but acknowledged no wrongdoing.[6]
While the Jones decision
ruled that a sitting president could be sued in federal court for unofficial conduct,
it left unresolved the question of whether an aggrieved party can pursue a state court action against a sitting
president. President Trump’s attorneys have argued that the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause protect him from civil litigation in the state court because placing
a sitting president at the mercy of a state court would create tension between
the federal and state governments.
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the
U.S. Constitution, states: “This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”[7] Since the President holds
an important federal office and is responsible for executing the supreme law of the land, President
Trump’s attorneys argued that a state court decision adverse to him would
appear to take precedence over him.
However, Judge Schecter disagreed with
President Trump, finding no conflicts with federalism. She held that President
Trump’s presidential privileges aren’t a ‘get out of court free’ card,
especially when the lawsuit is about alleged transgressions that predate his
assumption of the presidency in 2017. She wrote “Nothing in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution even
suggests that the President cannot be called to account before a state court
for wrongful conduct that bears no relationship to any federal executive
responsibility.” Here, Zervos sued Trump for statements made on the
campaign trail. Zervos is not suing Trump for what he did or said after
becoming president. Like Jones, who was suing Clinton for actions taken before
he was elected president, Zervos sued Trump for statements he made when
campaigning and prior to his election.
Judge Schecter reasoned that a state
court could accommodate President Trump’s needs or defer to him when he’s
conducting Presidential responsibilities. For example, the state court presumably
could not compel him to attend a trial on a day that his presence in Washington
is needed for national security purposes. Delaying the lawsuit isn’t justified merely
because the President may have to attend to a domestic or international crisis
at any moment. Should any such crises arise, a court adjudicating the dispute
will always recognize that his federal responsibilities take precedence and
will handle the lawsuit accordingly.
Summer Zervos isn’t the only woman suing
President Trump for defamation. Two other women, model Karen McDougal and adult
film actress Stormy Daniels, have filed lawsuits against Trump in California for
defamation after he publicly denied sexually harassing them and questioned the
truthfulness of their allegations.[8] Though it appears that the
floodgates for similar civil suits are now opened, Professor Edward Foley,
director of Election Law at The Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, cautions
against reaching such a conclusion. He said that the state courts adjudicating
each suit will exercise individual discretion when reaching a decision as to
whether to allow the suits to go forward. A state court will recognize that on
the one hand, “the judiciary will want to
look to the principle that no one is above the law,” while on the other, there
is “the risk of a civil lawsuit being a
genuine distraction such that it outweighs the interests of the litigants in
the civil suit.”[9]
In
response to the New York State Supreme Court decision, President Trump’s
attorney, Marc Kasowitz, announced that he would appeal Judge Schecter’s
decision immediately.[10] For a President who
relishes the spotlight, it doesn’t appear that it will be taken off him any time
soon.
[3] CHUTZPAH, FEATUREAN INTERVIEW WITH
GLORIA ALLRED, 43 Litigation 36, (2017).
[5] Mark Niles, “Nothing but Mischief: The
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity,” 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1275, (2002).
[7] U.S. Const. art. VI